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INTRODUCTION
Commentators have noticed a problem common to both historic preservation
laws and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”): the prospect of regulation
encourages property owners to destroy the very resources that these laws seek to
protect.1 The likelihood or imminence of designation of a property as a historic
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks for helpful comments on an earlier draft are due to
Fred Cheever, Dave Owen, Justin Pidot, and participants at workshops at the Sturm College of Law, University of
Denver, and the University of Maine School of Law. Special thanks go to the student editors of the Georgetown
International Environmental Law Review for their support in bringing this article to conclusion. © 2015, J. Peter Byrne.
1. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler & Joseph Tomain, Conservation without Regulation: Property-Based
Environmental Protection, 10 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 21, 21-22 (2009); Andrew P. Morriss
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landmark or within a historic district can lead the owner to demolish the building
before preservation restrictions become legally binding. Similarly, a landowner
may eradicate all members of a declining species or destroy the species’ habitat
before the species can be listed as threatened or endangered. Under current law,
these property owner actions would be entirely legal, economically “rational,”
and profoundly antithetical to the goals of the respective laws.2 Thus, historic
preservation laws and endangered species protections share a structural problem:
they create perverse incentives. They encourage property owners to frustrate
statutory policies before they legally prohibit the identical behavior.
The common elements that generate this paradox seem clear. Both legal
regimes impose severe regulatory restrictions on property owners, but only after
a formal decision has been made that a specific historic property or species
should be protected. Historic preservation laws, particularly at the local govern-
ment level, frequently prohibit or delay demolition of designated buildings,
landscapes, or other cultural properties, and require that alterations of, or
additions to, such properties meet some test of stylistic compatibility.3 The ESA
broadly prohibits any person to “take” an endangered species, which includes any
action to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,
or to attempt to engage in such conduct.”4 Significantly, the Supreme Court
upheld the agency’s interpretation of “harm” to prohibit alterations of species’
habitats on private land that actually harm those species.5 Both legal regimes
employ elaborate processes to identify the properties or species that should
receive this legal protection. The process for designation of a historic landmark,
for example, involves consideration by an appointed commission or legislative
body of documentary evidence and expert opinion concerning the historic
significance of the property.6 The listing of an endangered species requires the
& Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The “Living Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the
Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769, 795 (2000) (“A landowner who discovers an endangered species on
her land has the incentive to ‘shoot, shovel, and shut up.’”); Robin Pogrebin, Preservationists See Bulldozers
Charging through a Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at C1.
2. See, e.g., Adler & Tomain, supra note 1; Morriss & Stroup, supra note 1; Pogrebin, supra note 1. For
further discussion of the issue, see also Jonathan Flynn, Productive Preservation and the Reinvention of
Industrial America, 39 URB. LAW. 123, 141 (2007).
3. For a discussion of the standards governing demolition of historic structures, see Douglas B.Aikins, Demolition of
Historic Structures; CEQA Compliance and Tactics, 30 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 19 (2012). For an overview of standards for
exterior additions to historic structures, see ANNE E. GRIMMER & KAY D. WEEKS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NEW
EXTERIORADDITIONS TO HISTORIC BUILDINGS: PRESERVATION CONCERNS (2010), available at http://www.nps.gov/tps/how-
to-preserve/preservedocs/preservation-briefs/14Preserve-Brief-Additions.pdf.
4. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2013).
5. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (reviewing 50
C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994)).
6. See National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a(a)(1)(B), 470a(b)(1), repealed by
National Park Service and Related Programs, Pub. L. No. 113-287, 128 Stat. 3094 (2014); see also
N.Y.C CHARTER § 3020(1)-(2), (5) (2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/section%
201133_citycharter.pdf.
344 THE GEORGETOWN INT’L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:343
responsible federal agencies to make a series of findings, based on the best
available scientific evidence, that a species is in danger of extinction.7 This
process is notoriously slow and fraught with analytic and political obstacles.
Generally speaking, private parties are free from any legal restrictions regard-
ing these resources before designation or listing. At common law, a landowner is
free to use or demolish a building as he wishes, so long as it does not cause a
nuisance.8 Other land use regulations, such as zoning regulations, do not prohibit
demolition.9 Building codes or safety regulations may regulate the manner of
building demolition but do not restrain the decision to do so, except that they may
require the demolition of unsafe structures.10 Hunting regulations may restrict
direct killing of some game animal, such as migratory birds, but they have no
application to killing plants or invertebrates.11 Regulatory constraints on rural
landscape modification are virtually non-existent.
After designation or listing, however, historic preservation laws and the ESA
impose strong restrictions on harm to the protected resources on private property.
In cities with strong preservation ordinances, owners cannot demolish designated
buildings in most instances and must persuade a review board that additions or
alterations to such buildings meet a standard of appropriateness or compatibil-
ity.12 The weight of the ESA is even heavier on private parties, as it prohibits
7. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)-(b) (2013).
8. For further explanation, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005)
(describing the right to destroy one’s own property and its “ancient origins”).
9. See, e.g., CYNTHIA M. BARR, BOSTON ZONING: A LAWYER’S HANDBOOK § 9.3.1 (5th ed. 2013). But see
PATRICIA E. SALKIN, N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRACTICE § 11A:04 (4th ed. 2000).
10. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 235 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “building code” as “[a] law or regulation
setting forth standards for the construction, maintenance, occupancy, use, or appearance of buildings and
dwelling units”); Christine M.G. Davis et al., 10 OHIO JUR. 3D, Buildings, Zoning, and Land Controls § 340
(2015) (discussing demolition by municipality of dangerous nuisances); 1C ORDINANCE L. ANNOTATIONS,
Buildings § 148 (2014) (discussing ordinances prohibiting repair).
11. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 793 (defining “game” as “[w]ild animals and birds
considered as objects of pursuit, for food or sport; esp., animals for which one must have a license to hunt”).
12. See, e.g., N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MUNICIPAL HISTORICAL PRESERVATION 6-8 (2005),
available at http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Legal_Aspects_of_the_Municipal_Historic_Preservation.
pdf (giving a historical overview of common New York state practices typically requiring review board
approval for changes to a landmark); Historical Preservation Manual, CITY OF HOUSTON PLANNING & DEV.
DEP’T, http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/HistoricPres/HistoricPreservationManual/index.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2015) (“Alterations to the exterior of a City-designated Landmark, Protected Landmark, or a property
located in a City-designated Historic District require a Certificate of Appropriateness (COA) which are
generally issued through the review and approval of a project by the Houston Archaeological and Historic
Commission (HAHC). This includes restoration, rehabilitation, additions, exterior alterations, new construction
in a historic district, relocation and demolition of contributing structures in a historic district, or demolition of a
Protected Landmark.”); Making Changes to a Landmark, SEATTLE DEP’T OF NEIGHBORHOODS, http://
www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/preservation/makingchanges.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (“The following
changes require a Certificate of Approval before work can begin, even if no permit from the Department of
Planning and Development (DPD) is required[:] Any change to the exterior of any building or structure[;]
Installation of any new sign or changes to existing signs[;] A change in the color the building or structure is
painted[;] New construction[;] Demolition of any building or structure[;] Changes to the interior that show from
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them from “taking” a listed species, which includes significantly changing its
habitat.13
The insight upon which this article is built is that the common structures of
these two legal regimes create incentives toward destroying the resources they
seek to protect. The shift from legal freedom to exploit resources to strict
limitation on property modification and the lengthy and public process to
designate or list specific resources for protection provide the motive and the
opportunity to legally frustrate the application of the statutes. This article seeks to
understand how these perverse incentives are created and how they can be
lessened. The procedural and substantive provisions of both legal regimes have
evolved to reduce the perverse incentives created by the formal precipice
character of the regulatory structure.
This article compares the creation of such perverse incentives in the two legal
regimes of historic preservation and endangered species protection. Although the
incentives created by the ESA to “shoot, shovel, and shut-up” have been
discussed extensively in the literature,14 much less has been written about
the similar incentives in historic preservation, and no article has sought to
compare the effects of these laws. This article contends that valuable insights can
be gained through such a comparison. Pragmatically, efforts to lessen the
perverse incentives under one legal regime can suggest reforms to the other that
may also be beneficial. More generally, the comparison encourages one to
abstract from these approaches to resource protection and to clarify the structural
problem created by such a “precipice regulation.” It not only encourages
destruction of the resource that the law seeks to protect, but also may prompt the
owner to engage in wasteful expenditures that have no productive value other
than freeing the owner from future regulatory restrictions.
This article defines a precipice regulation as a legal regime that moves from
very low levels of property restriction to very high levels upon the completion of
a regulatory consideration of a specific resource found upon private property.
Any expected change in law can generate incentives to avoid ex ante the costs of
the reform. A precipice regulation differs from ad hoc statutory amendments
in that it adds preexisting restrictions to new resources. This article strives to
clarify the structural problems with precipice regulations and suggests ways to
lessen them. This article also considers important differences between historic
buildings and endangered species, and reflects upon the public values pursued by
the street . . . .”); What Does Landmark Designation Mean to Property Owners, N.Y.C. LANDMARKS PRES.
COMM’N, http://www.nycppf.org/html/lpc/html/faqs/faq_meaning.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
13. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302-03 (1991); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 50
C.F.R. § 17.3 (2013); Doug Williams, A Harder “Hard Case,” 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 931, 931 (2013).
14. Tony Hoch, Tools for Managing Endangered Species on Private Lands, 31 WYO. LAW. 30, 30 (2008); see
also Christopher S. Mills, Incentives and the ESA: Can Conservation Banking Live up to Potential?, 14 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 523, 528 (2004); Erin Morrow, The Environmental Front: Cultural Warfare in the West, 25
J. LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 183, 192 (2005).
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each. Historic buildings are easier to save than biologic species because historic
buildings co-exist more comfortably with modern property development, but the
mass extinction of species poses a greater threat to human welfare in the
foreseeable future.
Extensive literature exists on legal transitions, which focuses on changes in tax
law and pollution regulation.15 This literature has some bearing on the issues
discussed here, but precipice regulations are significantly different from new tax
legislation or pollution restrictions. The legal transition literature primarily
considers whether transition relief, usually grandfathering, from new laws
promotes efficient or fair outcomes.16 Grandfathering has little bearing on
precipice regulations, which, by definition, extend established regulations to
existing property arrangements. Designation and listing also should rarely upset
reasonable investment expectations because the regulatory system and criteria for
application exist long before application to any property. What the transition
literature does suggest is the necessity to consider how precipice regulations
shape property owners’ incentives before designation or listing.17
This article proceeds as follows. Part I describes each regulatory regime and
specifies the ways the regimes create incentives to destroy the resources they aim
to protect. Part I also reviews the literature identifying such perverse incentives
and what is known about the incidence of actual destruction. Part II addresses
actual and suggested changes to the procedures for designation or listing the
resources, while Part III looks at substantive changes in the laws that may have
the purpose or effect of moderating negative incentives. Finally, Part IV con-
cludes by considering the extent to which accommodation reforms further, or
compromise, the values that historic preservation and biodiversity laws advance.
I. SCHEDULING RESOURCES FOR PROTECTION: DESIGNATION AND LISTING
This section explains the legal processes by which legal protection is extended
to historic resources and to distressed species. This section also describes the
scope and gravity of these new legal protections and contrasts them with the
freedom enjoyed by the owner beforehand. This section shows how the public
nature and length of the proceedings create the opportunity for affected property
owners to destroy the targeted resources before regulatory protections become
applicable. This section concludes by comparing the similarities and differences
between the two regimes of historic protection and endangered species to suggest
an abstract understanding of precipice regulations.
15. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 47 (1977); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986);
Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl Kong, Regulatory Change and Optimal Transition Relief, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 1581 (2011).
16. See Graetz, supra note 15; Kaplow, supra note 15; Revesz & Kong, supra note 15, at 1613-15.
17. See generally Graetz, supra note 15; Kaplow, supra note 15; Revesz & Kong, supra note 15, at 1615-21.
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A. HISTORIC PRESERVATION
Historic preservation law seeks to preserve the significant buildings, land-
scapes, and other cultural resources that express the important events, persons,
and accomplishments of our past.18 To advance this goal, different levels of
government employ an impressive array of legal instruments. These include
public and private ownership of historical properties; privately negotiated but tax
supported preservation easements; requirements to collect and publish informa-
tion; tax credits; substantive and procedural requirements placed upon govern-
ment in dealing with historic resources; and regulation of historic private
property.19 Public regulation of private owners of historic properties occurs
primarily at the local government level.20 This article focuses on that local
regulation of privately owned historic buildings and landscapes.21 Such local
ordinances are similar in outline but differ greatly in details. This article discusses
most frequently the historic preservation law of Washington, D.C.22
Not all old buildings can or should be preserved. Selection must be made so the
more historically valuable ones can be preserved and put to new uses while the
others can be replaced by needed modern structures expressing contemporary
aesthetic notions. Thus, all historic preservation systems employ standards and
procedures to identify the buildings and other properties to be protected. The
18. National Park Service and Related Programs, Pub. L. No. 113-287, §100101, 128 Stat. 3094, 3096
(2014).
19. Only recently have scholars sought to provide comprehensive overviews of historic preservation law. See
generally SARA C. BRONIN & J. PETER BYRNE, HISTORIC PRESERVATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2012); SARA C.
BRONIN & RYAN ROWBERRY, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL (2014).
20. BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 268. Federal historic preservation law regulates the activities of the
federal government itself in engaging in building projects and in regulating or funding private activities under
other regulatory regimes. For example, when a natural gas supplier needs a permit from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to construct a natural gas pipeline, FERC must comply with section 106 of
the National Historic Preservation Act to consider whether the proposed pipeline will damage any historic
properties. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012). On the other hand, Section 106
does not prohibit federal agencies from engaging in, or authorizing actions that, damage historic properties,
although the process of consideration and consultation established by the regulations implementing the statute
provide incentives for agencies to avoid or mitigate such damage. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-800.16 (2014);
BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 106-11, 144-67.
21. Like other local land use laws, such as zoning, local historic preservation laws are authorized by state
grants of regulatory authority whether through specific state enabling statutes or through constitutional or
statutory “Home Rule” provisions. See BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 268-70. State-level historic
preservation ordinances generally support local or federal preservation activities and regulations. A major
exception is the California Environmental Quality Act, which has a major effect on private development in the
Golden State. See id. at 197-211.
22. Washington, D.C. has one of the strongest and best-documented historic preservation laws in the United
States. Researching local preservation laws is a frustrating task because decisions are poorly documented and
spottily collected. The Georgetown University Law Library provides a website collecting D.C.’s ordinances,
regulations, and judicial and administrative decisions implementing the law. See D.C. Historic Preservation
Decisions, GEO. L. LIBR., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/library/collections/histpres/index.cfm (last visited
Apr. 12, 2015).
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public process at the local level for choosing properties to be subject to
preservation regulations is called designation.23
Localities have adopted various procedures for designation, but nearly all bear
a strong family resemblance. Nearly all systems allow designation of individual
properties, called landmarks, and of assemblages of buildings and other features,
called historic districts.24 Nearly anyone can propose to designate a landmark or
district, and generally must submit documentary evidence about the property
tending to show that it meets the criteria.25 Such applications are reviewed by an
appointed board composed of members who are supposed to possess relevant
expertise in architecture, history, and law.26 In larger cities, a professional staff
capable of critiquing or contributing knowledge about the property will assist
such a board.27 The board holds a public hearing at which interested persons may
speak and vote whether to designate the property.28 In many jurisdictions, the elected
legislative body plays a role to reject, approve, or ignore the action or recommendation
of the board. In New York City, for example, the city council has 120 days to
disapprove an action by the Landmarks Preservation Commission (“LPC”) to desig-
nate a property or district.29 If it does so, the mayor can veto the disapproval.30 In
practice, political actions to upset commission designation are very rare.
Criteria for designation are phrased differently in different jurisdictions, but all
nonetheless seem to embody the same values. In general, they test whether a
property is historically “significant.”31 The fullest expression of this idea is found
in the National Park Service’s regulations for eligibility for listing on the National
Register of Historic Places (“National Register”), which has provided a model
often imitated by local governments.32 The regulations do not define “signifi-
cance” but weave the term through the criteria for listing:
The quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology,
engineering, and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and
23. See, e.g., Tracy Bateman Farrell et al., 12 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Buildings § 238 (2015).
24. Designation of a historic district regulates both the demolition and alteration of buildings and other
structures that contribute to the character of the district, and it also regulates new construction even on vacant
lots included within the district to foster development appropriate to the character of the district. See, e.g., A-S-P
Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1979).
25. National Register of Historic Places Program: Fundamentals, NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/nr/national_register_fundamentals.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
26. See, e.g., N.Y.C. CHARTER § 3020(1) (2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/
section%201133_citycharter.pdf (The Landmarks Preservation Commission shall include “at least three
architects, one historian qualified in the field, one city planner or landscape architect, and one realtor”).
27. See, e.g., id. § 3020(5).
28. See, e.g., id. § 3020(8).
29. Id. § 3020(9).
30. Id.
31. National Park Service and Related Programs, Pub. L. No. 113-287, §100507, 128 Stat. 3094, 3102
(2014); National Register of Historic Places, 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2014).
32. Katherine Ridley & Mark Silberman, 9A ENVTL. L. & REG. N.Y. 2D, Designation of Landmarks and
Historic Districts § 14:37 (William R. Ginsberg & Philip Weinberg eds., 2009).
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objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workman-
ship, feeling, and association and (a) that are associated with events that have
made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or (b) that
are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or (c) that
embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construc-
tion, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values,
or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components
may lack individual distinction; or (d) that have yielded, or may be likely to
yield, information important in prehistory or history.33
The National Register and all local ordinances require that a building have
integrity in addition to significance; that is, it must retain enough of the original
features that make it significant so that it can convey that significance to
observers.34 Thus, buildings that have been partially demolished or substantially
remodeled may not qualify. Some designation ordinances require that a building
have had significance for some minimum number of years—the National Regis-
ter specifies fifty years—and some designation ordinances allow designation of
more recent properties if they have “exceptional importance.”35
Much can be said about these interesting criteria,36 but for present purposes,
note that they are broad and inclusive. Indeed, there have been persistent,
although generally unsuccessful, attempts to persuade courts that such criteria are
unconstitutionally vague. Courts rejecting such claims have relied on the sup-
posed expertise of the members of preservation boards applying “professional
standards which are generally accepted in the field of historic preservation.”37
The breadth of the criteria does permit community members to argue for
designation in order to employ historic preservation as a land use device to stop
unwanted redevelopment. Carol Rose has argued that this collective push for
community self-definition has become the dominant value in historic preserva-
tion.38 While she offered a balanced assessment of this turn, others have critiqued
33. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2012).
34. In furtherance of this goal, the National Register requires “integrity of location, design, setting, materials,
workmanship, feeling, and association” and excludes “structures that have been moved from their original
locations, reconstructed historic buildings, [and] properties primarily commemorative in nature” from designa-
tion under ordinary circumstances. Id.
35. Id. § 60.4(g).
36. The tautological character of these criteria has long been criticized by preservation professionals. See,
e.g., Joseph A. Tainter & G. John Lucas, Epistemology of the Significance Concept, 48 AM. ANTIQUITY 707,
709-10 (1983) (“[S]ignificant properties are defined, in part, as those that possess significance.”).
37. Metro. Dade Cnty. v. P.J. Birds, Inc., 654 So. 2d 170, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); see also Maher v.
City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C.
1979). The glaring outlier is Hanna v. City of Chicago, where the court refused to dismiss a complaint
challenging Chicago’s preservation ordinance as unconstitutional, remaking that the language of the ordinance
was “vague, ambiguous, and overly broad.” 907 N.E.2d 390, 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
38. Carol Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 473 (1981).
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it as exclusionary NIMBYism impairing urban vitality.39 Still others have argued
that preservation has contributed substantially to recent urban revival.40
Generally speaking, property owners are given an opportunity for a hearing on
whether their properties will be designated, but they are not given the power to
veto the designation.41 The only issues before the preservation board are whether
the property has significance and whether it retains integrity. The owner has no
necessary expertise on either issue and may not have any material facts to present
on the issue of significance. Designation proceedings are considered quasi-
legislative in character, not implicating the due process rights of the owner. As in
a rulemaking proceeding, virtually anyone may comment, and testimony is
restricted only to limit time.42 Nonetheless, designation can have serious conse-
quences for affected property owners, which may stand in stark relief in the case
of an individual landmark addressing the rights of a single property owner.
Designation subjects a property to the continuing jurisdiction of the preserva-
tion law and review board.43 The owner will need a historic preservation permit
to demolish, alter, or add to the designated building, or to build a new structure
even on a vacant lot within a historic district.44 Although the stringency of these
permit systems varies greatly among U.S. cities, the most prominent permit
systems, for example those of New York and Washington, D.C., largely prohibit
demolition and require any changes to a property to be judged appropriate or
compatible by the preservation review board.45 At first blush, such restrictions
appear to have enormous economic consequences. The owner of a small house in
a historic district may wish to build a tall apartment building but cannot demolish
the small house or get a permit for a building that would be incompatible in size
with the surrounding houses.
The best-known example of the economic impact from historic preservation is
the New York City LPC’s rejection of a tall tower, permissible under applicable
zoning, on top of the landmark Grand Central Station. That decision, of course,
led to the Supreme Court’s crucial Penn Central decision denying the station
owner’s claim of a regulatory taking constitutionally requiring “just compensa-
39. See Edward L. Glaeser, Preservation Follies: Excessive Landmarking Threatens to Make Manhattan a
Refuge for the Rich, 20 CITY J., no. 2, 2010, at 62.
40. See J. Peter Byrne, Historic Preservation and Its Cultured Despisers: Reflections on the Contemporary
Role of Historic Preservation Law in Urban Development, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 665 (2012).
41. See BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 79. But see National Park Service and Related Programs, Pub. L.
No. 113-287, § 302105(b), 128 Stat. 3094, 3193 (2014) (“If the owner of any privately owned property . . .
object[s] to inclusion or designation, the property shall not be included on the National Register or designated as
a National Historic Landmark until the objection is withdrawn.”); id. chs. 3121, 3123, 128 Stat. at 3191-97.
42. See, e.g., N.Y.C. LANDMARKS PRES. COMM’N, supra note 12.
43. See, e.g., N.Y.C. CHARTER § 3020 (2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/
section%201133_citycharter.pdf; Glaeser, supra note 39.
44. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 6-1104(e) (2001).
45. See, e.g., N.Y.C. LANDMARKS PRES. COMM’N, supra note 12; N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 12.
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tion.”46 Even those who approve the Court’s treatment of the constitutional claim
recognize that the owner suffered a large loss in economic potential from the
station, which could have been realized in the absence of preservation restric-
tions.47 The owner did not obtain reciprocity of advantage because the station
was an individual landmark rather than a contributing building in a historic
district; thus, no corresponding restrictions on surrounding lots increased the
value of Penn Central’s economic stake.48
Property owners facing designation of their buildings can imagine themselves
in the shoes of Penn Central. Before designation, they can legally demolish their
old building and build within the entire zoning envelope. After designation,
however, they would need to propose plans to the preservation board, which
could be a long and expensive process, and they still face the possibility that any
proposed demolition, alteration, or new addition would be rejected. To avoid
designation of a landmark, they need only to demolish enough of their current
buildings to deprive them of “integrity.” Property owners can then wait for
market conditions to signal a propitious time for new construction, and they can
be confident that their lots will not be subject to preservation jurisdiction. This
scenario suggests, unfortunately, that owners have an incentive to demolish
buildings that they otherwise might retain, at least for a while, in order to
preclude designation and its attendant regulatory burdens. This is the perverse
incentive at the heart of this paper.
Leading casebook authors in related fields have highlighted the owner’s
incentive to demolish all or part of a building before designation as a perverse
incentive created by preservation laws.49 Professor Strahilevitz has stated the
concern most completely:
46. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
47. William A. Fischel, Lead Us Not Into Penn Station: Takings, Historic Preservation, and Rent Control, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 749, 754 (1995).
48. Justice Rehnquist made this point forcefully in his Penn Central dissent:
Even where the government prohibits a noninjurious use, the Court has ruled that a taking does not
take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land and thereby “secures an average
reciprocity of advantage.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. [393, 415 (1922)]. It is for this
reason that zoning does not constitute a “taking.” While zoning at times reduces individual property
values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on the whole an
individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be benefited by another.
Here, however, a multimillion dollar loss has been imposed on appellants; it is uniquely felt and is
not offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation of some 400 other “landmarks” in New York
City. Appellees have imposed a substantial cost on less than one one-tenth of one percent of the
buildings in New York City for the general benefit of all its people.
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). Today, New
York City has more than 1300 individually designated landmarks, and it seems less clear that landmarks do not
enjoy reciprocity of advantage.
49. ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 500 (3d ed. 2005);
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1286 (2007).
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[T]he owner of a building that has some historic or architectural merit – but that
will not become eligible for landmark designation for ten more years – might
maintain the exterior of the building poorly or remove the most architecturally
interesting ornamentation in the years preceding landmark eligibility. These
acts or omissions might substantially reduce the likelihood of costly govern-
ment regulation in the not-too-distant future.50
While he seems to bemoan the incentives that would cause an owner to demolish
a property before the owner would otherwise rationally decide to do so, Professor
Strahilevitz’s celebration of the creative force of destruction suggests that he
would not otherwise regret the loss of a structure that the community would have
wanted to preserve through designation.51 These authors seem to recognize that
the perverse incentives are the result of a disconnect between private costs and
public benefits, but none seem to recognize that the designation process, shifting
demolition at one moment from free to prohibited, creates the legal space where
the owner can safely respond to the incentive to demolish.
Empirical evidence for the scale of demolition in anticipation of designation is
virtually non-existent. Such research is very difficult because buildings are
demolished for all sorts of reasons, and studying perverse incentives requires
some insight into the subjective motivation of the owner. Theorists cite anecdotes
in newspaper accounts, but these are subject to varying interpretations.52 Some
evidence can be gleaned from a series of New York City cases where the LPC
exercised its discretion not to schedule a hearing on designation while owners
either demolished or substantially altered buildings.53 To be sure, these are
special cases that reflect a tacit agreement between the owner and the LPC to
allow demolition or alteration to occur, rather than a unilateral exploitation of a
structural weakness in the law. But they do illuminate an effort to fend off
designation until the building could become ineligible. The context strongly
suggests the motivation of the owner.
There is a clear case from Washington, D.C. of an owner demolishing a
building to avoid the legal effects of designation. The creation of the Downtown
Historic District in the 1980s stimulated a great deal of anticipatory demolition.
Designation of a historic district then in the 1980s and today requires documenta-
tion about the age, style, history, and condition of every building within the
50. Strahilevitz, supra note 8, at 818.
51. Id. at 820-21 (“Denying owners the right to destroy property that becomes embarrassing, unfashionable,
unproductive, or obsolete threatens the impulses that spur future creation.”).
52. Ellickson and Been cite a New York Times article on a related topic: owners letting their buildings
deteriorate because they do not want to engage the legal process for a historic permit. ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra
note 49, at 500 (citing Shawn G. Kennedy, Landmarking’s Double-Edged Sword: Sometimes It Works Against
Preservation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at 1). But that article relied on after-the-fact statements by owners and
described real estate conditions during an economic downturn where building deterioration could have had
many causes.
53. Robin Pogrebin, An Opaque and Lengthy Road to Landmark Status, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A1.
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proposed district. From the time the Downtown Historic District was first
proposed until 1984 when designation finally became legally complete, fifteen
buildings were demolished.54 The most notorious demolition was of the 1906
Ouray Building, which was actually demolished after the State Historic Preserva-
tion Officer (“SHPO”) had approved designation of the Downtown Historic
District.55 Apparently, the owners had filed for a demolition permit on January
30, 1984, the SHPO approved the district on February 10, and another District
office issued the demolition permit on March 19 after having looked to see
whether the building was protected on January 30.56 After demolition began on
March 30, a preservation organization secured a temporary restraining order to
halt further work, but the D.C. Court of Appeals eventually held that the permit
had been lawfully issued. The Court held that the SHPO’s designation did not
become effective until notice was published in the D.C. Register, and that the
owner’s actual knowledge of the designation decision was legally irrelevant.57
The failure to effectively implement the designation of the Downtown Historic
District probably reflected disagreement within the District government about the
wisdom of creating a historic district in a downtown desperate for investment,58
but the ultimate economic and urban success of D.C.’s downtown redevelopment
fully vindicates the role of historic preservation in urban revival.
B. ENDANGERED SPECIES
The federal listing of species as endangered or threatened is a notoriously slow
and fraught process. Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act directs the
Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce to maintain by regulation lists of
species at risk of extinction.59 These duties are carried out by agencies within the
respective departments. The Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) administers the
ESA for land animals, plants, and fresh water fish, and the National Marine
Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) administers the Act for marine species.60 Although
the agencies can initiate a listing process themselves, it is far more common for
agencies to respond to petitions filed by interested persons, usually an environ-
mental organization. When a petition is filed, the agency must determine within
54. See Marcia A. Slacum, D.C. Protects 200 Buildings in Downtown Historic Districts, WASH. POST, Mar.
25, 1984, at B3.
55. See Bernhart Mingla, City Authorizes Demolition of Protected Historic Building, WASH. POST, Apr. 12,
1984, at 3.
56. See id.
57. See Don’t Tear It Down, Inc. v. The Morris and Gwendolyn Cafritz Found., No. 84-919, (App. D.C. July
20, 1984) (on file with author).
58. See Wendy Swallow, D.C. To Rethink Downtown Historic District, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1984, at B3.
59. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2) (2013). A species is “endangered” if it is “in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” Id. § 1532(6). A species is “threatened”
if it “is likely to become an endangered species within their foreseeable future.” Id. § 1532(20).
60. Id. § 1533(h); see JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 349 n. 1 (2d. ed. 2009).
354 THE GEORGETOWN INT’L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:343
ninety days whether it “presents substantial scientific or commercial information
indicating that [listing] may be warranted.”61 If a positive determination is made,
the agency then has twelve months to resolve the petition by either (1) listing the
species as endangered, threatened, or neither; or (2) finding that listing is
warranted but “precluded,” which means that listing will be delayed due to other
listing processes for other species at a higher priority for preservation.62 If a
species is listed, protections come into effect in thirty days.63
Despite the apparently tight time schedules established in the ESA, delays are
abound. In addition to simple failures to meet deadlines, species for which listing
is warranted, but precluded, are placed on a candidate list where they can
languish for years.64 Frequent litigation both creates judicially enforced time-
tables and complicates efforts by the agencies to comply. More discretionary
designations of “critical habitat” for listed species rarely occur. Political opposi-
tion to listing in the executive branch, especially during the George W. Bush
Administration, has brought listing to a near halt, and resistance in Congress has
resulted in inadequate resources for the agencies to carry out their duties even
when eager to do so.65
The effects of listing a species as endangered can be dramatic for private
property owners. Section 9 of the ESA prohibits any person to “take” an
endangered species.66 The Act defines “take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct.”67 FWS regulations interpret “harm” to include “significant habitat
modification or degradation.”68 The Supreme Court upheld the FWS interpreta-
tion in its important Sweet Home decision in 1995.69 Such a prohibition makes
sense within the terms and goals of the statute. “For decades, scientists have been
warning that habitat loss is the single most important threat to biodiversity, and
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2015).
62. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
63. 50 C.F.R. § 424.18 (2014). For a brief overview of the listing process, see U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
LISTING A SPECIES AS THREATENED OR ENDANGERED: SECTION 4 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2015),
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/listing.pdf.
64. Gabriel Eckstein & Jesse Snyder, Endangered Species in the Oil Patch: Challenges and Opportunities
for the Oil and Gas Industry, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 379, 393 (2013); K. Mollie Smith, Abuse of the Warranted
but Precluded Designation: A Real or Imagined Purgatory?, 19 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 123 (2010).
65. Davina Kari Kaile, Evolution of Wildlife Legislation in the United States: An Analysis of the Legal Efforts
to Protect Endangered Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 463 (1993);
M. Lee Smith Publishers, Service Seeks to Defer Action on Ten Critical Habitat Designations, 17 CAL. ENVTL.
INSIDER, no. 1, 2003, at 10.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2015).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2015).
68. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. The full definition limits the definition to habitat
modification that “actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.” Id.
69. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995).
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Congress was well-aware of this when it enacted the statute.”70 Nonetheless,
listing a species as endangered imposes a duty on a property owner upon whose
land the species is found not to modify or degrade habitat, which can severely
limit construction, draining, lumbering, or agriculture.71 Violations can result in
criminal as well as civil penalties.72 While Congress must have understood that it
was imposing stringent duties on the federal government, it is not clear that
Congress understood that it was imposing a federal land use regulatory law on
private owners.
The prohibition of habitat modification on private land makes the ESA the
most powerful and pervasive federal land use regulation. Justice Scalia, in his
dissent in Sweet Home, claimed that requiring the preservation of habitat on
private land “imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin – not just on the
rich but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national
zoological use.”73 The ESA previously had earned the reputation of being “the pit
bull” of environmental law, in that it mandated the preservation of species
without balancing ecological values against economic or social priorities.74 The
Supreme Court’s famous decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, halting
construction of a multi-million dollar dam in order to protect the endangered snail
darter, fomented widespread public awareness of the power of the ESA.75 These,
and all other provisions of the ESA, govern only how the federal government
conducts its business or manages public lands. Not surprisingly, the subsequent
application of the ESA to private lands, confirmed in Sweet Home, brought forth
howls of complaints from property rights advocates and serious concerns from
thoughtful scholars about whether, and how, to most effectively enlist private
owners in species conservation.76 Additionally, landowners have little hope of
compensation under takings jurisprudence, as there have been very few success-
ful takings claims based on ESA regulation of private land use.77
70. Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenges of Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 150
(2012).
71. James A. Adkins, Student Environmental Feature, Ethical Treatment of Private Property Owners When
Implementing Protection Measures for Rare and Endangered Species, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 423 (1999); see
Hoch, supra note 14.
72. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2015) (penalties and enforcement).
73. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995).
74. See, e.g., RASBAND ET AL., supra note 60, at 364-65.
75. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
76. Adkins, supra note 71; Steven G. Davison, The Aftermath of Sweet Home Chapter: Modification of
Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking in Violation of the Endangered Species Act, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L
& POL’Y REV. 541 (2003); Duane J. Desiderio, Sweet Home on the Range: A Model for As-Applied Challenges to
the “Harm” Regulation, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 725 (1997); Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, Judicial
Application of the Endangered Species Act and the Implications for Takings of Protected Species and Private
Property, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 509 (1997); 2003 UPDATE: THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND
HOW IT AFFECTS LAND USE, SJ015 ALI-ABA 383, 409 (2003).
77. Ira Michael Heyman, Property Rights and the Endangered Species Act: A Renascent Assault on Land
Use Regulation, 25 PAC. L.J. 157, 162 (1994) (noting that “not one successful taking claim under the
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The ESA provides no protections for any species before listing. The destruc-
tion of flora and fauna on one’s own land generally is entirely unregulated. State
law regulates the hunting of certain game animals and federal law of migratory
birds.78 Land use law has long been committed to local governments acting under
delegated state authority.79 Indeed, the Supreme Court has subsequently inter-
preted federal authority over wetlands narrowly on the ground that “[r]egulation
of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”80 It is rare for state or
local law to concern itself with habitat on private land.
Because listing a species under the ESA applies dramatic new prohibitions to
private land, the prospect of listing creates an incentive for private owners to
avoid such regulation by excluding the species from their properties. This can
take the form of direct extirpations, for example, through hunting or applying
herbicides, or of indirect exclusion through the destruction of habitat. Such
actions may be narrowly rational, in that the expenditures in excluding the
species may be far lower than the costs imposed by the ESA through restricting
the use of the land, the benefits of which are widely distributed over the entire
community. Given the slow course of the listing process, property owners have a
long and clear opportunity to destroy species on their properties before federal
protections become effective. Moreover, such actions are likely entirely legal.
The ESA generates perverse incentives for landowners at several points. If a
species is listed and resides on the owner’s land, the owner may resort to the
method of “shoot, shovel, and shut up.”81 Although this phenomenon often is
referred to in literature,82 little data understandably exists about such blatantly
illegal conduct. An easier manifestation of perverse incentives to study occurs
when a listed species is nearby but not yet on the owner’s property. Formal
studies have found owners destroying habitat to prevent endangered species not
yet resident on their properties from migrating to their properties.83 The perverse
[Endangered Species] Act has been prosecuted in any Federal Court”). But see Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319-20 (2001) (water use restrictions imposed under ESA constituted
taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment).
78. Migratory Bird Hunting, 50 C.F.R. § 20 (2014) (federal regulations governing migratory bird hunting);
Hunting, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/hunting/ (last visited Apr. 12. 2015).
79. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926) (upholding the constitutionality of
local zoning).
80. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006).
81. Ronald Bailey, Shoot, Shovel, and Shut Up: Celebrating 30 Years of Failing to Save Endangered Species,
REASON (Dec. 31, 2003), http://reason.com/archives/2003/12/31/shoot-shovel-and-shut-up. shovel-and-shut-
up. See generally Gardner M. Brown Jr. and Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species Act, 12 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 7 (1998).
82. See PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES: BIOLOGICAL NEEDS, POLITICAL REALITIES,
ECONOMIC CHOICES 16 (Jason F. Shogren & John Tsirchart eds., 2001); WILDLIFE AND SOCIETY: THE SCIENCE OF
HUMAN DIMENSIONS 217 (Michael J. Manfredo et al. eds., 2009).
83. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act,
46 J. L. & ECON. 27 (2003); John A. List et al., Is the Endangered Species Act Endangering Species? 1-2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12777, 2006).
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incentives of the ESA are no secret. The press regularly documents the negative
responses of private landowners to listing proposals.84 Conservative talk radio hosts
froth over supposed injustices to landowners.85 Scholars have written many articles
discussing these incentives and proposing suggestions to reduce them.86 Both conserva-
tionists and property rights advocates have focused on the unintended consequences of
the Act in their efforts to make the legislation more effective and to reduce the land use
controls it imposes. Even the federal agencies responsible for the Act’s implementation
have recently asked for suggestions on how to improve incentives under the Act to
enhance private landowner participation.87
C. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN DESIGNATION AND LISTING
This article asserts that historic preservation law and the ESA create similar
perverse incentives and that comparison of the two legal regimes will generate
both practical and theoretical insights. This subsection highlights the several
similarities between the two in the service of identifying the elements that create
these perverse incentives. A later section turns to consider the differences
between the two legal regimes.
Several parallels are fairly obvious and have already been alluded to. Each
places strong new prohibitions on private property upon the administrative
identification of a specific resource to be protected. The sharp distinction between
the levels of restriction on property dominion, before and after designation,
justifies describing such laws as employing “precipice regulations.” Such a
dramatic change may upset an owner’s settled expectations about how the law
shapes its property rights, increasing the likelihood that the owner will view the
change as unfair or disproportionate.88 In these cases, moreover, the instant
change in legal rights will be preceded by a long and public regulatory
proceeding that enables concerned owners to anticipate the sharp change—to
84. In North Carolina, landowners began clearing timber from their property while the FWS mapped the
location of Red Cockaded Woodpecker nests, fearing more land would be placed off limits to logging or
development. Mayor Joan Kinney explained, “People are just afraid a bird might fly in and make a nest and their
property is worth nothing. . . . It is causing a tremendous amount of clear-cutting.” Wade Rollins, Woodpecker
Mapping Gets Chain Saws Buzzing, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 7, 2006, at A1.
85. See, e.g., Elizabeth Shogren, Richard Pombo and the Endangered Species Act, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct.
24, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId4971014.
86. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Money Or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences Of
Uncompensated Land Use, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 301, 320-32 (2008); J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act And
Private Property: A Matter Of Timing And Location, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 46 (1998); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study In Takings And Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305
(1997).
87. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Expanding Incentives for Voluntary Conservation
Actions Under the Endangered Species Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 15,352 (proposed Mar. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pts. 13, 17, & 402).
88. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1235 (1967).
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stare up at the precipice (perhaps inducing vertigo). Finally, the owner may be
able to take timely and cost-effective measures to avoid the increase in regulatory
burden that are entirely lawful, even if they directly frustrate the goals of the
prospective legal regulation. These common features describe the problem of
precipice regulations in the abstract and provide a first look at how they create
perverse incentives.
There are additional similarities between historic preservation and the ESA
that exacerbate the perverse incentives in each case. Both pursue widely diffused
public benefits while imposing concentrated costs on affected private land. In the
case of historic preservation, the benefits are those that derive from keeping
buildings and other structures in our midst that embody our architectural and
cultural heritage. Whether these benefits are described as increased bonding with
our nation or locality, aesthetic pleasure, or opportunities for community voice,
they are public goods enjoyed by all. For landmarks (as opposed to historic
districts), owners bear economic costs, without reciprocal benefits, which are
spread throughout the community. In the case of preventing extinctions, the
benefits may be even more widespread. Preserving biodiversity may contribute to
the long-term health of the planet as well as its beauty and spiritual power.89
More practically, it preserves biological resources that may have valuable human
uses in the future for medical and other applications. Both legal regimes aim to
protect the currently conceived interests of future generations. The costs of each
come from the restrictions placed on the land hosting the protected resource.
As the prior paragraph suggests, the benefits pursued by these laws are not only
widely distributed, but they are also difficult to articulate, and they are contest-
able. Both emerged from the political goals of the 1960s and early 1970s to
improve the quality of collective life in an economy producing widespread
individual prosperity.90 Both laws were offered as responses to land develop-
ment, seen as causing crises of mass destruction to historic resources and
extinctions. Few or none of these benefits are obtainable in markets and are
therefore amenable to even a moderately precise cost-benefit calculation. Propo-
nents of historic preservation and species protection often disagree among
89. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (2d ed. 1992).
90. 16 U.S.C § 470(b)(4)-(5) (2013):
[T]he preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its vital legacy of
cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and
enriched for future generations of Americans[.] [I]n the face of ever-increasing extensions of urban
centers, highways, and residential, commercial, and industrial developments, the present governmen-
tal and nongovernmental historic preservation programs and activities are inadequate to insure future
generations a genuine opportunity to appreciate and enjoy the rich heritage of our Nation . . . .
See also S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 2 (1973) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990 (commenting on the proposed ESA: “Consideration of this
need to protect endangered species goes beyond the aesthetic. In hearings before the Subcommittee on the
Environment it was shown that many of these animals perform vital biological services to maintain a ‘balance of
nature’ within their environments.”).
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themselves about the values promoted.91 Nonetheless, both laws evoke strong
emotional support among proponents who are sometimes deeply committed to
the goals. Both laws also frequently invoke ethical convictions that everyone has
a moral duty to protect dwindling species or historic sites, which draw on long
cultural traditions. Not all landowners may share these values, at least with the
same intensity, even though they bear costs for realizing them. Indeed, they may
strongly reject these values in favor of more individualistic norms, for example,
Lockean notions of property as essential to liberty. Such ethical gulfs exaggerate
perceptions of the steepness of the precipice.
Both historic preservation laws and the ESA have taken on far larger roles in
resource management than was predictable at their births. Until the mid-1960s,
historic preservation law involved primarily the voluntary preservation and
rehabilitation of a few noteworthy buildings from the distant past, usually
associated with some highly significant figure in American history, such as
George Washington, or of exceptional aesthetic quality.92 Public regulation of
private property was restricted to a few urban backwaters, such as Charleston,
South Carolina and Georgetown in Washington, D.C., enjoying a high degree of
local support.93 Today, preservation plays a central role in real estate develop-
ment and the protection of neighborhoods in many major cities. In Washington,
D.C., for example, historic protection covers nearly twenty percent of the
buildings, and historic districts cover important parts of the downtown as well as
a majority of the most attractive residential areas.94 In Manhattan, preservation
laws apply to sixteen percent of the land south of 96th Street, the most valuable
real estate in the nation.95 Understandably, such growth has generated criticism,
both that preservation on such a scale has deleterious effects and that the original
enactors never anticipated such a large role.96
Similarly, the ESA plays a much larger role in resource management than
could have been anticipated in 1973. In a recent paper, J. B. Ruhl characterized
the growth of the ESA this way:
91. For further discussion on the changing perspective of environmental preservation, see J. PEYTON DOUB,
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION, SUCCESSES, AND CONTROVERSIES 204-08 (2013);
W.H. “Buzz” Fawcett, Refocusing the Endangered Species Act, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND
PERSPECTIVES 394, 394-411 (Donald C. Baur & W.M. Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010). For further discussion on
the changing perspective on historical preservation, see BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 17-35.
92. See AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW, 1966-1996 (ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC
PRESERVATION, 1996), SJ 015 ALI-ABA 57, 61 (2004). See generally Rose, supra note 38.
93. Hunter S. Edwards, The Guide for Future Preservation in Historic Districts Using a Creative Approach:
Charleston, South Carolina’s Contextual Approach to Historic Preservation, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221,
223 (2009).
94. Byrne, supra note 40, at 670 n. 42.
95. See Glaeser, supra note 39.
96. See, e.g., id.
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[T]he ESA was seen as the odd bird among environmental laws in the 1970s,
capable of stopping a federal dam but seemingly posing no broad regulatory
constraints on private landowner and business interests. Over time, however,
changes in agency implementation of the ESA gave the statute the qualities of
the “big” pollution control statutes, with expansive jurisdiction over land use,
complex regulations, expensive and time-consuming permitting, and a gristmill
of environmentalist litigation.97
The extension of Section 9 to habitat modification of private land, the key
enlargement of the ESA, occurred through administrative interpretation of a
vague word rather than through deliberative political choice.
Without that extension, the ESA would directly regulate land use only on
federal land; it would only indirectly limit other land use choices. For example,
under Section 7, federal agencies must “insure” that any actions that they
undertake, fund, or permit “are not likely to result in the destruction or adverse
modification of [the critical] habitat of such species.”98 If the land use regulatory
reach of the ESA had been limited to federal actions, it would resemble the key
federal historic preservation provision, Section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act.99 Section 106 requires federal agencies to consider the effects
of the undertakings, including awarding federal money and issuing permits, on
properties eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.100 How
the federal government conducts its own business will both touch fewer cases and
generate less rabid criticism than federal regulation of private land use.101 The
ESA’s regulation of private land use also remains anomalous within our federal
structure because it is the only federal law to directly prohibit otherwise normal
land development.102
97. J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the Supreme Court, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
487, 492 (2012).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2013).
99. Section 106 provides:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or
federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any Federal department or independent
agency having authority to license any undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of
any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take
into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is
included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The head of any such Federal agency
shall afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation established under Title II of this Act a
reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking.
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012).
100. See generally BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 106-67.
101. Of course, section 106 of the NHPA does not impose a substantive duty on federal agencies, only duties
to consider and consult. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012). Section 7 of the ESA does impose substantive duties on
agencies not to contribute to the degradation of critical habitat or “jeopardize” the existence of a listed species.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). Nonetheless, section 106 pushes agencies toward preservation, while
agencies frequently elude the broad duties created by section 7. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470f, 1536(a)(2) (2012).
102. In contrast, for example, wetlands permits are permissive. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2013).
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The common nature of listing and designation proceedings may also aggravate
property owners’ views of injustice. In both local historic preservation decisions
(usually) and in listings of endangered species, administrative officials make
decisions based solely on historic or scientific criteria, respectively.103 Historic
preservation designation turns on the historic significance and integrity of a
property.104 Determinations of the status of a species must be based on best
available scientific evidence.105 Such inquiries render the concerns or goals of the
property owner irrelevant. Such proceedings are legislative rulemakings, in
which owners do not have party status.106 Not surprisingly, owners retain no veto
over designation or listing.107 The decision to designate a property or list a
species disempowers affected property owners.
These similarities reinforce the common problem of perverse incentives under
local historic preservation laws and the ESA. The laws impose new limitations on
land use that owners may perceive as onerous and lacking in legitimacy. They
also afford disgruntled owners lawful opportunities for destroying the resource
intended to be protected while the decision to protect is pending. Culturally, the
laws also advance communitarian values based on cultural or ethical values
actually contested. These strong similarities suggest that the remedies for
perverse incentives under one legal regime may also be useful in the other.
II. PROCEDURAL FIXES
Given the problems of perverse incentives previously described, one would
expect to find that both local historic preservation laws and the ESA have failed to
achieve their purposes. In fact, both can be credited with significant successes.
Historic preservation has been a conspicuous contributing element in the most
lively and sought-after cities and neighborhoods in our current urban revival.108
103. Many local designation ordinances retain some role for the local legislative body to approve or
disapprove the actions of the appointed preservation board, but such powers seem rarely exercised in leading
jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MUNICIPAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION 6-9 (2011),
available at http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Legal_Aspects_of_the_Municipal_Historic_Preservation.
pdf.
104. See National Register of Historic Places, 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2014).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2013).
106. See id. § 1533(b)(5) (2013); see also N.Y.C. LANDMARKS PRES. COMM’N, supra note 12.
107. Some cities do require owner consent for landmarking and positive majorities of owners for designating
historic districts. CITY OF HOUSTON PLANNING & DEV. DEP’T, supra note 12. Under the NHPA, owners can object
to and prevent the listing of their properties on the National Register. National Historic Preservation Act of
1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(6) (2012). This may be the most illusory right conferred by any federal statute. Under
section 106, federal agencies consider the effects of their undertaking on properties eligible for listing on the
National Register. Blocking formal listing has no effect on the regulatory process. Failure to list the property
formally, however, will prevent the owner from obtaining benefits, such as federal historic preservation tax
credits. See BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 69, 594.
108. See Ryan Howell, Throw the “Bums” Out? A Discussion of the Effects of Historic Preservation Statutes
on Low-Income Households through the Process of Urban Gentrification in Old Neighborhoods, 11 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 541, 541-42 (2008).
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The ESA, despite many difficulties, has saved species that otherwise would have
become extinct and has placed habitat protection within crucial resource planning
processes, such as that for California water.109 Both legal regimes have evolved
to cope with their expanded roles.
This section of the article, as well as the next, considers innovations under both
legal regimes that have ameliorated the perverse incentives previously identified.
When similar innovations are found, these similarities are compared to see how
their characters are suited. When innovations have emerged under only one legal
regime, this article considers whether they could be successfully deployed under
the other. This section considers procedural devices to prevent perverse incen-
tives, assuming that other elements of the statute remain constant, and the
subsequent section examines substantive evolutions that have lessened the
perverse incentives by emphasizing benefits for owners.
A. REACHING BACK
Some historic preservation ordinances have managed an aspect of the perverse
incentive to demolish a building before designation by extending interim protec-
tion to a building before designation. One straightforward device to accomplish
this is by prohibiting demolition of a building while the petition to designate it is
pending before the preservation review board.110 If the board then designates the
building, it will be saved.111 If it decides not to designate the building, the owner
can proceed with demolition.112 The owner’s burden of procedural delay can be
minimized by requiring the board to promptly decide the designation issue.
Washington, D.C.’s Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act
provides interim protection through its definition of a historic landmark to
include a “building . . . and its site . . . for which an application for [designation]
is pending with the Historic Preservation Review Board.”113 The Act specifies
that the Historic Preservation Review Board (“HPRB”) must schedule a hearing
and decide upon the designation issues within ninety days of the filing of the
application.114 The functioning of this interim protection was clarified and is
109. See generally Sandra K. Dunn, Endangered Species Act Versus Water Resources Development: The
California Experience, 25 PAC. L.J. 1107 (1994); Eric M. Yuknis, Would a “God Squad” Exemption under the
Endangered Species Act Solve the California Water Crisis?, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 567 (2011).
110. See BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 97-105, 144 (discussing Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC v.
D.C. Mayor’s Agent for Historic Pres., 944 A.2d 1036 (D.C. 2008)); cf. Brian Uzdavinis, To Save or Not to
Save: Historic Preservation in New Jersey—Justifications, Hindrances, Future, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
649, 692-94 (2007) (explaining New Jersey laws that allow for anticipatory demolition and arguing for changes
in the law that would prevent anticipatory demolition in the way described here).
111. BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 97-105, 144.
112. Id.
113. D.C. CODE § 6-1102(6)(B) (2001).
114. Id.
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illustrated by a D.C. case locally referred to as the Italian Embassy case.115 A
developer planned to convert the former Italian embassy building and complex
into condominium residences; the plan involved demolition of part of the main
building and the construction of a tower adjacent to it.116 In September 2005, the
developer applied to the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs
(“DCRA”) for a series of construction permits.117 Although DCRA issued two
preliminary permits in December, applications for most, including those to alter
and renovate the existing buildings and build the new one, had not yet been
issued when the D.C. Historic Preservation Office filed an application in January
2006 to landmark the complex.118 DCRA then issued the additional alteration and
construction permits in early February, and the HPRB voted to designate the
property later that month.119 The HPRB also determined that DCRA had issued
the final permits in error because a designation permit was pending and that the
permits should not issue because the planned redevelopment was inconsistent
with the purposes of the Act.120 The Mayor’s Agent, a peculiar administrative
official to whom the HPRB’s determinations are recommendations, accepted this
understanding and application of the Act.121 The D.C. Court of Appeals upheld
the administrative interpretation of the statute and the judgments of the HPRB
and Mayor’s Agent.122 In so holding, the court found:
The agency’s regulations create a logical continuum that balances the interest
of property owners and the public interest in historic preservation . . . where a
landmark designation application is filed after a permit application, the HPRB
must both hold a hearing and decide whether to make the designation within
ninety days, counted from the date the designation application is official.123
It might be objected that D.C.’s interim protection merely moves back in time the
point at which an owner might demolish a property in order to avoid regulation to
some earlier time, well before a designation application would be filed. While
this risk cannot be completely eliminated, the structure of the D.C. process
provides a safeguard against it. As is common, an owner needs construction
permits in order to demolish or substantially alter the exterior of any building.124
Applications for these permits are matters of public record.125 Advocacy groups
115. Embassy Real Estate Holdings, 944 A.2d at 1036.
116. Id. at 1040-42.
117. Id. at 1042-43.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. D.C. CODE § 6-1105(a) (2001).
121. The author currently serves as the Mayor’s Agent, although he did not serve at the time of the case.
122. Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. D.C. Mayor’s Agent for Historic Pres., 944 A.2d 1036, 1044-45
(D.C. 2008).
123. Id. at 1048.
124. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 12-A, § 105.1 (2013); see also D.C. CODE § 6-1102(1)(A) (2012).
125. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 12-A, § 105.1.7 (2013):
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or, as in the Italian Embassy case, the historic preservation staff itself, can
monitor these applications and may be able to file designation applications before
the construction permits are issued.126 The owner’s vested right to proceed with
construction does not ripen until (at least) the construction permits are issued.127
D.C.’s approach allows the designation application to stay the issuance of
construction permits until designation is decided.128 Thus, alert preservationists
can always get a determination of historic protection before demolition can
proceed, so long as they quickly assemble a designation application.
The power of this approach to diminish the perverse incentive can be
highlighted by comparing it with the process in New York City. There, a citizen
application to designate a building does not stay the issuance of demolition
construction and permits.129 Moreover, the chair of New York’s LPC has wide
discretion whether to schedule a hearing on such a designation request.130 On
several occasions, the LPC chair refused to hold a hearing while owners
demolished or substantially remodeled noteworthy buildings that probably mer-
ited designation under applicable criteria.131 In one instance, a new owner largely
replaced the fac¸ade of 2 Columbus Circle, the well-known, if aesthetically
controversial, “lollipop” building designed by Edward Durrell Stone while New
York cultural celebrities like Tom Wolfe and Herbert Muschamp denounced
LPC’s passivity.132 In D.C., the owner could not have proceeded while the
application was pending, and the HPRB would have to give a ruling within ninety
Before a raze permit is issued, the owner of the building or other structure to be razed, or the owner’s
agent, shall post and maintain a notice furnished by the code official on the fac¸ade fronting on the
public street of the building or other structure as designated by the code official, so as to be visible
from the public way. The raze permit shall not be issued by the code official until at least 30 days after
the date the notice is posted on the building or other structure.
See also Track Status of Building Permit Application, D.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND REG. AFFAIRS,
http://pivs.dcra.dc.gov/OBPAT/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). The status of any building project in
D.C. can be tracked either by address or by application number.
126. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 10-C, § 203 (2012).
127. Zoning law generally affords vested rights to an owner after a construction permit is issued and
substantial expenditures have been made toward the project. See PACE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO
LAND USE LAW, available at http://www.law.pace.edu/sites/default/files/LULC/LandUsePrimer.pdf.
128. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 10-C, § 209.1 (“Immediately after an application is officially filed, the staff shall
provide written notification to the Permit Processing Division of DCRA.”). “Within five (5) days of receipt of a
notice of a filed historic landmark application, the owner of the property shall notify the staff if there is a permit
application for the property pending at DCRA.” Id. § 209.6; see also D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 12-A, § 105.1.7.1
(“Prior to issuing a raze permit, the code official [DCRA] is authorized to require the applicant to submit
clearances and/or information, including, but not limited to . . . historic preservation.”). While the historical
board is not explicitly authorized to stop a demolition permit, it is required to immediately notify the permitting
agency of an application.
129. See, e.g., Pogrebin, supra note 1.
130. See In re Citizens Emergency Comm. to Preserve Pres. v. Tierney, 896 N.Y.S.2d 41 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010).
131. See, e.g., Tom Wolfe, The 2 Columbus Circle Game, N.Y. MAG., July 4-11, 2005, at 22.
132. Id.
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days.133
The monitoring of all demolition permit applications in order to identify efforts
to demolish a historically significant building can be burdensome for preserva-
tion groups. Some cities require that applications for demolition permits for all
buildings over fifty years old be forwarded to the preservation board.134 The
ordinance in Cambridge, Massachusetts, for example, has such a process. The
Cambridge Historical Commission reviews all such applications, and if its staff
finds that a building may be significant, the Commission must hold a public
hearing and decide whether to designate it within forty-five days of its receipt of
the application.135 This approach simplifies the monitoring of demolition applica-
tions and shifts the burden of reviewing applications to public officials in order to
protect significant buildings.136
Could this approach help protect a dwindling species before it is listed as
endangered? At first blush, this approach seems promising. Recall that when
citizens file an application to list a species, the FWS and NMFS have ninety days
to determine whether the petition is “warranted.”137 The agencies might adopt
regulations applying Section 9 to any warranted species until the agency
completes its determination of whether the species should be listed as endangered
or threatened, or not listed.138 If listing is warranted, the species needs help, and
133. One might see a parallel in the virtual refusal to list new species during the George W. Bush
administration. Political appointees repeatedly interfered in listing decisions to derail scientific assessments of
risk to species. See Juliet Eilperin, Since ’01 Guarding Species is Harder, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2008, at A1.
The listing of species slowed to a crawl during the eight years of the Bush administration, which listed
a mere 62 species, all under court order, for a rate of seven species per year. In contrast, the Clinton
administration listed 522 species for a rate of 65 species per year and the Bush Sr. administration
listed 231 species for a rate of 57 species per year. Meanwhile, literally hundreds, if not even
thousands, of species await protection.
Listing Species Under the Endangered Species Act, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biological
diversity.org/programs/biodiversity/endangered_species_act/listing_species_under_the_endangered_
species_act/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2015); see also W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Idaho 2007).
134. See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE § 2.78.090 (Supp. 5 2012), available at https://www.municode.com/
library/ma/cambridge/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeIdTIT2ADPE_CH2.78HIBULA_ARTIIDEBUDEBEHISI_
2.78.090PRDE&codeArchiveDate2012-12-21; REDLANDS, CAL., CODE § 15.44.070 (current through Redlands, Cal.,
Ordinance 2807 (Oct. 7, 2014)), available at http://sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/index.php?book_id
550&section_id292710; CITY OF SEATTLE DEP’T OF NEIGHBORHOODS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND SEPA REVIEW
(2012), available at http://www.seattle.gov/neighborhoods/preservation/documents/CAM3000_002.pdf.
135. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE § 2.78.090.
136. Section 106 of the NHPA requires an agency to consider the effects of its undertakings on any property
eligible for the National Register. This can be understood as another form of reaching back in affording a
resource protection before listing. Section 106, however, does not restrict what private owners may do with their
property, creating only duties on the part of the federal agency to consider and consult about effects. It does not
generate perverse incentives of the magnitude of local preservation laws. This analysis highlights that the ESA
would generate much weaker perverse incentive if it was restricted to federal actions, as under section 7 of the
ESA, or at least if section 9 had been interpreted not to prohibit habitat degradation.
137. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2013).
138. However, the section 4 listing procedures permit the agencies to issue regulations to protect species in
366 THE GEORGETOWN INT’L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:343
this approach would provide interim protection until a more complete study is
undertaken. Environmentalists might argue that the burden of inertia while a
determination is pending should not fall on a dwindling species and that such a
rule would lessen the incentives for officials to delay ruling on the listing
application.
Yet there are reasons to doubt such a broad interim rule would have construc-
tive results. Some candidate species are widely distributed even though their
numbers are dwindling, and their habitats cover a wide range.139 Providing the
species interim Section 9 protection against habitat modification would suddenly
introduce new federal land use prohibitions that would likely be poorly under-
stood and that could have dramatic economic consequences for farmers and other
economic sectors.140 Enforcement would also be difficult. Unlike the case of
building demolition permits, there is no general permitting system for rural
landscape modification in which species conservation measures could intervene.
Section 9 has to be enforced through litigation, which is slow, expensive, and
deeply contentious. A more limited interim prohibition against direct takes
through hunting and fishing, however, could be beneficial and enforceable
through mandates to existing state hunting and fishing regulations.
The benefits of an interim protection rule seem fewer for species conservation
than for building preservation. Even large, famous buildings can be destroyed
quickly. Demolition need only destroy the elements that express the building’s
significance to preclude designation. Designation battles, like that over the Italian
Embassy, resemble sprints in which there will be clear winners and losers
depending on whether the buildings receive preservation protection before the
wrecking ball swings (or the permits are issued). Preservation in its most basic
sense is simply the prevention of destruction of an inert structure. Conservation
of an endangered species is a far more difficult and longer-term task. Preservation
of a species requires a thorough understanding of its biology and ecology, and
planning to protect or restore the habitat upon which it depends. Even the best
planning may be unsuccessful. The challenges of saving species will be even
greater due to accelerating climate change.141 Moreover, it is an unusual case
the case of emergencies. Id. § 1533(b)(7). At a minimum, this provision allows the agencies to prohibit taking a
warranted species when there is a reasonable concern that actors will take the species while the listing procedure
is going forward.
139. For a discussion on how opposition to a candidate affects duration of the application process, see Amy
Whritenour Ando, Waiting to be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of
Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & ECON. 29 (1999).
140. Other expansions of Section 9 through the courts has already been seen as confusing and controversial.
See, e.g., Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking under the Endangered
Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155, 228 (1995); Shannon Petersen, Endangered Species in the Urban
Jungle: How the ESA Will Reshape American Cities, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 432 (2000).
141. See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, Species and Ecosystem Impacts, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 307 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the
Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (“The pika is
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where the killing of one small group of animals or the destruction of a single
grove of trees will make the difference between extinction and survival. Thus,
time is less crucial, making interim protection less essential. At the same time, the
quality of the longer-range conservation plan for an endangered species, and the
resources devoted to carrying it out, are central to avoiding extinction.
The time limits that force the preservation boards in D.C. and Cambridge to
decide on designation are not likely to work for the FWS and NMFS listing
processes. The federal agencies already have statutory timetables for listing
decisions, which they frequently violate.142 Litigation has resulted in judicial
orders for the resolution of certain candidate species, but litigation causes delay
in addressing other petitions.143 The potential scope of agencies’ work is mind
boggling, and Congress refuses to give the agencies sufficient resources to
administer the ESA out of a combination of political hostility and competing
priorities.144 On the other hand, creating interim prohibitions on direct takes may
encourage the political overseers to allow the listing process to move in a more
timely manner. One might, for example, require states to seek approval for state
hunting regulations for any candidate species. Any such interim procedures
would, of course, only add to the agencies’ workload, potentially slowing final
listings further.
It is difficult to identify a single, simple rubric about the decline of a species
that would trigger a listing process with interim protection in the way a building
being fifty years old does in Cambridge. Calculating the risk to a species of
extinction involves many factors, and it amounts to a prediction about the future
of the species. Broadly speaking, that risk depends both on the number of
individuals and on the amount of present and prospective quality habitat for the
species. This distinction points to a significant difference between the two legal
regimes. Historic structures are preserved because of their “significance,” their
capacity to convey important themes about our history to people today. While
practically significant in the timing of petitions, the imminence of risk of
destruction plays no role in the criteria for designation.145 Indeed, designations as
toast.”).
142. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334, 340 (9th Cir. 1996); Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Norton, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, No.
Civ. 98-1093-KI, 1999 WL 1042567, at *7 (D. Or. Nov. 17, 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 309 F.3d 1166
(9th Cir. 2002).
143. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council, 99 F.3d 334; Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1049;
Biodiversity Legal Found., 1999 WL 1042567, at *7.
144. Compare M. LYNNE CORN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42466, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE: FY2013
APPROPRIATIONS AND POLICY 3 (2012) (Congress appropriated $20.8 million to FWS for listing and critical
habitat activities during fiscal year 2012), with, e.g., Rashard Lewis, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://
www.basketball-reference.com/players/l/lewisra02.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (the Washington Wizards
paid Rashard Lewis $21.1 million for the 2011-2012 season).
145. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2013) (referencing presence of a threat, but not imminence of that threat). But see
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CANDIDATE SPECIES: SECTION 4 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2014), available
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landmarks and as historic districts are denied for lack of integrity when too few of
the features that convey significance remain. By contrast, species are protected
without regard to their significance to people’s value of nature. Rats and flies are
protected as well as polar bears when they are in danger of extinction. Dwindling
numbers make listing more likely, and listing will not be denied because too few
individuals remain.146 Thus, the ESA uses a qualitatively different inquiry to
determine listing from historic preservation, which does not lend itself to
objective triggers for listing inquiries.
B. STAYING DESIGNATION OR LISTING
A quite different possible procedural wrinkle to dampen the perverse incentive
to destroy resources may be to stay the listing in exchange for a credible
commitment by property owners to protect the resource. Property owners often
negotiate preservation easements with non-profit preservation groups when they
wish to preserve their properties and obtain tax benefits.147 The owners in the
Italian Embassy case discussed above made a similar attempt.148 Being aware
that the property was “clearly eligible for designation,” the owner entered into an
agreement with a leading preservation group thought most likely to petition for
designation.149 That agreement committed the owner to preserve many elements
of the building, including interior features that could not be reached by the D.C.
Act.150 The agreement, however, did not bind the D.C. Historic Preservation
Office, which itself petitioned the HPRB to designate the property as a landmark.151
This raises the question of whether a local ordinance might authorize the
preservation board or its staff to negotiate preservation agreements with develop-
at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/listing.pdf:
Candidate species receive no statutory protection under the ESA . . . [Official c]andidate species are
assigned a listing priority from 1 to 12 based on the magnitude of threats they face, the immediacy of
the threats, and their taxonomic uniqueness . . . The species’ listing priority dictates the relative order
in which proposed listing rules are prepared, with the species at greatest risk (listing priority 1 through
3) being proposed first.
146. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 63:
Because of the number of candidates and the time required to list a species, we developed a priority
system designed to direct our efforts toward the plants and animals in the greatest need. In our priority
system, the degree or magnitude of threat is the highest criterion, followed by the immediacy of the
threat and the taxonomic distinctiveness of the species . . . The ESA gives no preference to popular
species or so-called ‘higher life forms.’
147. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38
IDAHO L. REV. 453 (2002); see also, e.g., Earl T. Redding, The Preservation of Civil War Battlefields: Preserving
Our History and Culture, 8 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 237, 262 (2004).
148. Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. D.C. Mayor’s Agent for Historic Preservation, 944 A.2d 1036,
1041-43 (D.C. 2008).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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ers, under which owners would commit to providing certain preservation enhance-
ments in exchange for not designating the property. The availability of such
arrangements would diminish an owner’s incentive to demolish a building to
avoid regulation because an agreement might flexibly permit profitable develop-
ment projects. Of course, some boards refuse to designate properties in order to
not frustrate development, as is demonstrated by the New York City examples
discussed above, but such decisions wholly sacrifice preservation values.152
Various forms of development agreements and contract zoning make such
agreements common in urban land use law more generally.153 However, I am
unaware of any preservation ordinance providing preservation boards with a
comparable power. Why?
The chief reason may be that historic permitting of development projects
involving designated properties already allows for substantial discretion. Owners
are not prohibited from altering or adding to historic properties. Rather, they must
persuade preservation boards that the changes from a development project will be
appropriate or compatible.154 This article discusses the importance of this at
greater length in Part III. For now, note that preservation boards do bargain with
owners after designation about the scope of changes proposed for develop-
ment.155 Designation brings such projects under the jurisdiction of preservation
law and preservation boards.156 Other land use laws are different: all land in a
jurisdiction would already be subject to zoning regulation, giving a planning
office or elected officials the leverage to negotiate a development plan by
amending the zoning for the specific property.157 Municipal officials trade away
152. See Wolfe, supra note 131.
153. Miral Alena Sigurani, Protecting Property Preserving Nature: The Benefits of Conservation Easements,
ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 2003, at 34, 35 (“Conservation easements are one of the most effective and commonly used
land protection tools available to private landowners.”); State Requirements for Valid Conservation Easements,
50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, available at 0140 SURVEYS 46 (Westlaw) (conservation easement laws are present
in nearly every state).
154. See Byrne, supra note 40, at 670-71.
155. See, e.g., Andres Viglucci, Miami-Dade Protects Two Historic Surfside Buildings, Puts Bay Harbor
Island in its Sights, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 18, 2014, 9:14 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
community/miami-dade/article4651344.html (buildings were saved because of a “unique compromise” be-
tween developer and city); Shawndrea Thomas, Developer Gets to Keep Brick Steps after Compromising with
City, FOX 2 NOW NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013), http://fox2now.com/2013/09/23/developer-gets-to-keep-brick-steps-
after-compromising-with-city/.
156. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis Historic Preservation Commission, CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, IND.,
http://www.indy.gov/egov/city/dmd/ihpc/pages/home.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (“The Indianapolis
Historic Preservation Commission (IHPC) is a nine-member board appointed by the executive and legislative
body of the consolidated city, with design and zoning review jurisdiction in the locally designed historic
districts and conservation districts.”); Historic Preservation Board, CITY OF PORTLAND, ME., http://
www.portlandmaine.gov/210/Historic-Preservation-Board (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (“The Historic Preserva-
tion Board has the jurisdiction to review and approve applications for a certificate of appropriateness for exterior
alterations, site improvements, and new construction affecting: Designated landmarks, Buildings and sites
within historic districts, [and] Historic landscape districts.”).
157. Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agree-
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onerous restrictions on a parcel in exchange for public amenities, such as
transportation enhancements.158 Analogous leverage comes to the preservation
board only after designation.
The ESA makes more use of negotiated stays against listing. Property owners
can avoid the weight of the ESA by supporting species abundance as well as by
extirpating the species from their land.159 The former approach can prevent
listing by reducing the danger of extinction. Landowners thus also have a positive
incentive for conservation, consistent with the goals of the ESA, at least within
certain cost parameters. Property owners can take socially beneficial steps to
avoid listing under the ESA, where owners of historic properties, by contrast,
really cannot avoid designation by being good stewards.
Individual landowners, however, generally cannot protect a species because
they very rarely will own enough habitat that they can leave undisturbed (or
restore) to help the species thrive. Thus, landowners face a sort of prisoner’s
dilemma, where their conservation efforts will go for naught unless other
landowners cooperate to conserve enough habitat. In the absence of assurance of
such cooperation, individuals can have little confidence that their conservation
measures will protect the species enough to defeat listing.
What appears to be the case is that state governments have stepped in to
coordinate conservation activities to stave off ESA listing.160 States have the
motivation to do this both to satisfy important constituencies, such as ranchers or
drillers, and to maintain state control over wildlife management and land use
regulation. States have the capacity to do this through their ownership of state
lands and their plenary regulatory authority over property.161 Constituents that
normally would oppose state regulation may be motivated to support it as less
ments, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 977-78 (1987).
158. Id. This is how Arlington, Virginia, transformed its transit corridor and overall character in the past half
century. Planning and Development History, ARLINGTON CNTY. GOV’T, http://projects.arlingtonva.us/planning/
history/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
159. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 81; Morriss & Stroup, supra note 1, at 795-96; Richard Stroup, The
Endangered Species Act: Making Innocent Species the Enemy, PROP. & ENV’T RESEARCH CTR., http://perc.org/
articles/endangered-species-act-1 (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
160. See, e.g., ERIK M. MOLVAR & MEGAN MUELLER, WILD EARTH GUARDIANS, TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE:
INADEQUATE REGULATORY MECHANISMS AND THE PLIGHT OF THE GUNNISON SAGE GROUSE 6 (2014), available
at http://www.wildearthguardians.org/site/DocServer/Inadequate_Regulatory_Mechanisms_and_the_Plight_
of_GSG_R.pdf; Harriet Hensley, The Role of State Conservation Plans in the Listing of Endangered and
Threatened Species, ADVOCATE (Boise, Idaho), Oct. 1999, at 8; Melissa Savage & Douglas Shinkle, Keeping it
Wild: Preserving Wildlife and Habitat While Allowing Development and Outdoor Recreation is a Tough
Balancing Act, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
environment-and-natural-resources/keeping-it-wild.aspx; see also KAUSH ARHA & BARTON H. “BUZZ” THOMP-
SON, WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV’T, STANFORD LAW SCH., POLICY PAPER: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND
FEDERALISM: EFFECTIVE SPECIES CONSERVATION THROUGH GREATER STATE COMMITMENT 2 (2005), available at
https://woods.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/files/Endangered-Species-Act-Policy-Paper-20050224.pdf.
161. ARHA & THOMPSON, supra note 160, at 9; Jessica Bennett Wilkinson, The State Role in Biodiversity
Conservation, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 1999, at 71.
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onerous or oppositional than federal regulation, particularly under Section 9.
The FWS has embraced such cooperation as providing means to garner greater
cooperation in species conservation, which includes, but goes beyond, reducing
perverse incentives.162 Cooperation also may lessen political hostility to the
ESA. During the Clinton Administration, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt
oversaw a great burst of creativity in devising and implementing various
cooperative strategies.163 Candidate Conservation Agreements between FWS and
other federal agencies, state and local governments, and private property owners
exchanged specific commitments for conservation according to a negotiated plan
for a federal commitment not to list the species.164 An important example is the
1996 Barton Springs Salamander Conservation Agreement and Strategy, under
which the FWS agreed with various Texas state departments on a conservation
plan for the tiny aquatic salamander that lived only in the Austin Park containing
the city’s famous and delightful spring-fed swimming pool.165 Secretary Babbitt
then withdrew a proposed FWS rule listing the salamander as endangered,
expressly based upon the commitments in the agreement.166 The federal court,
however, held that such reliance on the conservation agreement violated the ESA,
which mandated that listing decisions be made on the “best available science”
and not on political considerations.167 The court might have reached a different
conclusion if the plan had not seemed so speculative about whether it would be
effective or even carried out, and if the political pressures on the Department of
Interior had not been so blatant.168
The FWS continues to enter into Candidate Conservation Agreements but does
not promise to not list species, even though avoiding listing is the primary
motivation for most state and private parties to agree.169 Currently, there are a
162. See, e.g., Allyson Barker, et al., The Role of Collaborative Groups in Federal Land and Resource
Management: A Legal Analysis, 23 J. LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 67, 87 (2003); Kendra Womack, Factors Affecting
Landowner Participation in the Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances Program 37-50 (Dec. 1,
2008) (unpublished graduate thesis, Utah State University), available at http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article1028&contextetd.
163. See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and “Takings”: A Call for Innovation within the
Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355 (1994).
164. See generally Martha F. Phelps, Comment, Candidate Conservation Agreements Under the Endangered
Species Act: Prospects and Perils of an Administrative Experiment, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 175 (1997).
165. Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739, 742 (W.D. Tex. 1997); Proposal to List the Barton
Springs Salamander as Endangered, 59 Fed. Reg. 7968 (proposed Feb. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17), withdrawn by 61 Fed. Reg. 46,608 (Sept. 4, 1996); Hensley, supra note 160.
166. Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg.
46,608 (Sept. 4, 1996).
167. Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739; see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F. Supp.
2d 121 (D.D.C. 2001); Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998).
168. Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 745 (“The Court finds that strong political pressure was
applied to the Secretary to withdraw the proposed listing of the salamander.”).
169. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS (2011), available at http://
www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/CCAs.pdf; Womack, supra note 162, at 10-11, 37-45, 71-76, 84-86,
98-100.
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series of agreements concerning conservation measures for the greater sage
grouse, the listing that FWS decided was warranted but precluded in 2010, thus
making it a candidate species.170 A lawsuit settlement involving the many
candidate species languishing in that status required the FWS to decide by 2015
whether to list the sage grouse or remove it from the candidate list.171 Congress
muddied the waters in late 2014 by adding a rider to an omnibus spending bill
preventing the FWS from mandating new protections for the birds for a year.172
The agency, nonetheless, has been actively working with state and private
partners, as well as the federal Bureau of Land Management, to devise voluntary
plans for sage grouse habitat conservation.173 The effort aims to restore sage
grouse enough to avoid listing the species as endangered.174 Such a decision
might be sustained if implementation of habitat protection commitments con-
tained in the plan offered a realistic likelihood that the species would not become
extinct.
The FWS finesses its legal inability to promise not to list a species as a
condition of securing conservation commitments by providing private landown-
ers with Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances (“CCAA”).175
Under such an arrangement, the FWS and a private landowner agree on habitat
preservation measures for private land.176 In return, the FWS issues an “Enhance-
ment of Survival Permit,” which promises that “if the species is subsequently
listed and no other changes have occurred, the FWS will not require the permittee
to conduct any additional conservation measures without [the permittee’s]
consent.”177 The owner is issued an incidental take permit under Section 10 of the
ESA to exempt any such takings from Section 9.178 FWS also employs program-
matic CCAAs, under which the FWS enters into conservation agreements with
170. An account of the FWS efforts regarding the sage grouse can be found on the FWS website. Greater
Sage-Grouse, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/species/birds/sagegrouse (last
modified June 30, 2014).
171. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, No. 10-cv-377, consolidated,
In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., MDL No. 2165, Misc. Action No. 10-377 (EGS)
(D.D.C. July 12, 2011), ECF No. 42-1.
172. See Erik Molvar, Congress’s Hostile Takeover of Endangered Species Efforts, THE HILL, (Dec. 15, 2014,
7:30AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/227096-congress-launches-hostile-takeover-
of-sage-grouse.
173. MOLVAR & MUELLER, supra note 160; Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S.
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/more/sagegrouse/frequently_asked_questions.html
(last updated Jan. 22, 2015).
174. MOLVAR & MUELLER, supra note 160.
175. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 169; Candidate Conservation/Candidate Conservation
Agreements, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/cca.html (last updated
June 16, 2014).
176. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 169; Candidate Conservation/Candidate Conservation
Agreements, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 175.
177. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 169.
178. Id.
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state, local, or tribal governments, which in turn can provide legal assurances of
limited duties to private owners who enter into the CCAA.179 This gives
non-federal government actors the authority to overcome barriers to agreement
among private parties.180
Central to all of these efforts to address habitat preservation while permitting
development is the Habitat Conservation Plan (“HCP”). Congress amended the
ESA in 1982 to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to permit the “incidental
take” of an endangered species when “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”181 Such a permit is issued only in
connection with an approved HCP, which should “minimize and mitigate” the
impacts of the development.182 HCPs can apply to both listed and non-listed
species, including those that are candidates for listing. FWS seeks to use HCPs as
early as possible before a species is in danger of extinction; obviously doing so
leaves open the greatest range of approaches and offers the best chances for
conservation of the species. An HCP may be entered into simply between the
FWS and the property owner, but some result from negotiation among many
affected parties, including local governments and the FWS.183 The Secretary
attempted to make HCPs more attractive to property owners by adopting a “No
Surprises” policy, which promises owners who enter into HCPs that they will not
be required to provide more money or land during the life of the plan, even if the
needs of the species change.184 This landowner protection has been controversial
with conservationists, but is somewhat mitigated by the use of adaptive manage-
ment plans in HCPs, which allow for flexibility in the face of changes in the
species’ prospects.
HCPs have become central to the administration of the ESA. As of 2005, the
FWS had approved over 430 HCPs.185 Use of HCPs has substantially lessened
political pressure for major legislative reform of the ESA. Plainly, they have
lessened the precipice effect of listing under the ESA by providing property
179. Id.
180. Michael Bean observed, “Both safe harbor agreements and CCAAs are examples of administratively
created ideas to avoid some of the conservation disincentives that were unintentionally created by the regulatory
requirements of the Endangered Species Act.” Michael Bean, Landowner Incentives and the Endangered
Species Act, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 206, 213 (Donald C. Baur & W.M.
Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010).
181. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2013); see Douglas P. Wheeler & Ryan M. Rowberry, Habitat Conservation
Plans and the Endangered Species Act, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, 220, 222
(Donald C. Baur & W.M. Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010).
182. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2013).
183. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS: WORKING TOGETHER FOR ENDANGERED
SPECIES 3 (2005), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCPsWorking
Together5-2005web%20.pdf.
184. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
185. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS: SECTION 10 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT 1 (2005), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCP_Incidental_Take.pdf.
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owners a means to continue development activities after listing. At the same time,
it is not yet clear that HCPs will achieve the success of which they are capable
because the FWS lacks the means, and perhaps the will, to include all stakehold-
ers in negotiations of HCPs, monitoring compliance, and employing adaptive
conservation management.186
A prominent example of the use of an HCP to protect a vulnerable species
involves the coastal California gnatcatcher, a songbird whose habitat is the
coastal scrub vegetation of southern California and northern Baja California in
Mexico. By the early 1990s, the gnatcatcher’s numbers had declined primarily
because of habitat destruction due to massive urban development.187 After
commencing the process to consider listing the gnatcatcher as endangered or
threatened, FWS entered into discussions with the state of California and
numerous private and local government parties to establish an HCP.188 The
process was substantially aided by California’s enactment in 1991 of its Natural
Community Conservation Planning Act (“NCCP Act”), which authorized the
California Department of Fish and Game to enter into an “agreement with any
person or public entity for the purpose of preparing a natural community
conservation plan, in cooperation with a local agency that has land use permit
authority over the activities proposed to be addressed in the plan, to provide
comprehensive management and conservation of multiple wildlife species.”189
The NCCP Act thus promoted ecosystem-wide habitat planning supported by the
regulatory powers of local governments. The resulting HCP incorporated ten
planning processes under the NCCP, which has set aside in perpetuity more than
half of all gnatcatcher habitat—organized in large parcels with connecting
corridors—while also allowing urban development to proceed on other sites
under the regulation of local governments.190 The FWS implemented the HCP by
listing the gnatcatcher as threatened rather than endangered, and by issuing an
incidental take permit pursuant to Section 10(a).
The FWS five-year review in 2010 found that the HCP had at least halted the
decline of the gnatcatcher:
Together, the ongoing and anticipated implementation of the State’s NCCP
process and the Federal HCP process (pursuant to section 10 of the Act) are
making substantial contributions to the conservation of the gnatcatcher by
creating a network of managed, core-and-linkage preserves within the areas of
186. See Alejandro Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons From A Study in Maladaptive Management,
55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 329 (2007).
187. Determination of Threatened Status for the Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 16,742, 16,751
(Mar. 30, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (listing the gnatcatcher as threatened).
188. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., COASTAL CALIFORNIA GNATCATCHER, FIVE YEAR REVIEW: SUMMARY AND
EVALUATION 12 (2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/ecos/ajax/docs/five_year_review/doc3571.pdf.
189. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2810(a) (2015).
190. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 188, at 12.
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the range of the gnatcatcher in the United States with the largest populations of
gnatcatchers. Implementation of section 7 of the Act has also been effective in
reducing the amount of incidental take on the gnatcatcher.191
It remains to be seen whether such cooperative arrangements will prove success-
ful in saving species and protecting habitats long-term.
Through these regulatory approaches, the federal government bargains away
its coercive power under Section 9 in exchange for cooperative measures by
private landowners.192 In doing so, it seeks to convert the perverse incentives
presented by the prospect of listing into wholesome incentives for conservation,
providing inducements and collective action that may overcome the prisoner’s
dilemma. Why does the withholding of listing play a larger role in the ESA than
in historic preservation law?193 At this point, this article can offer only tentative
suggestions. First, preserving biodiversity is a far more difficult task than
preserving historic structures. We may not know enough to save some dwindling
species.194 More fundamentally, preserving biodiversity at high levels may
simply not be compatible with growing human populations eager for economic
prosperity. Broad cooperation and buy-in to affirmative conservation measures
seem essential for any chance of success.195 Historic preservation can be
accomplished largely by restricting demolitions and inappropriate alterations.196
191. Id. at 31.
192. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., USING EXISTING TOOLS TO EXPAND COOPERATIVE CONSERVATION FOR
CANDIDATE SPECIES ACROSS FEDERAL AND NON-FEDERAL LANDS 1 (2008), available at http://www.fws.gov/
endangered/esa-library/pdf/CCA-CCAA%20%20final%20guidance%20signed%208Sept08.pdf; Womack, su-
pra note 162, at 2-12.
193. Professor Bill Buzbee has pointed out to the author the structural similarity of these CCAAs to the
evolution of negotiated Brownfields agreements in the shadow of massive liability under CERCLA. See
William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Development, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1997). CERCLA created sterile urban real estate, not through precipice regulations,
but through broad and dramatic retroactive liability for anyone ever having had a substantial interest in property
currently contaminated. Reform developed through state and local governments seeking to accommodate local
property owners and their own needs for development of blighted spaces with CERCLA’s liability scheme.
Federal law eventually recognized and embraced negotiated solutions, providing safe harbors from liability to
developers who carried through approved plans for remediation and redevelopment. 1 ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION OF LAND USE § 9:14 (2014).
194. Owen, supra note 70, at 156 (Professor Dave Owen has cogently written: “Uncertainty pervades
implementation of the ESA. The services do not always know the extent to which a proposed action will affect a
species’ viability. They are also often uncertain about species’ status and population trends.”).
195. Landowners’ fear of economic loss causes them to not even cooperate with gathering information on
their land. See Stephen Polasky & Holly Doremus, When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on
Private Land with Imperfect Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 22 (1998).
196. See, e.g., JULIA H. MILLER, NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., PROTECTING POTENTIAL LANDMARKS
THROUGH DEMOLITION REVIEW (2006), available at http://www.preservationnation.org/information-center/
sustainable-communities/creating/teardowns/demolition_review.pdf; Gregory A. Ashe, Reflecting the Best of
Our Aspirations: Protecting Modern and Post-Modern Architecture, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 69, 71
(1997) (buildings featuring significant architecture but which are too “young” to qualify for historic preserva-
tion statutes “are all in danger of being destroyed or altered (which for most architectural purposes is tantamount
to being destroyed)”); Barbara Ditata, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Historic
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Moreover, even when burdensome for an individual landmark owner, it does not
threaten overall economic welfare, as can be seen from the fact that cities with the
highest property values (New York, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco) also
have the most aggressive preservation regulations.197 Designation under a strong
ordinance very likely will save a historic building, even if resources and
ingenuity are needed to adapt it to current uses.
Second, the ESA has generated far more political opposition than has historic
preservation.198 Some of this opposition is related to the issues grouped under the
first point. But it is also significant that the ESA is a federal statute administered
by federal agencies that displaces state authority. It may also bear more heavily
on regions whose economies are more committed to resource extraction or where
human economic activity places more strain on natural systems. Thus, represen-
tatives to the federal government and important constituencies have come to
oppose the administration of the ESA, leading to a search for devices to lessen
opposition.199 Withholding listing accommodates development interests and
states in which these interests wield decisive political power. Historic preserva-
tion of private property, by contrast, occurs at the local level. Although some-
times highly controversial, preservation battles occur in smaller, more homogenous
communities. Those jurisdictions that do not value it as highly simply have less
of it. There is far less of a sense of a distant power imposing onerous regulations
on localities that would not adopt them by their own political wills. Overall,
political conflict is avoided by devolution.
C. RETROACTIVE LIABILITY
Some legal regimes attempt to counter perverse incentives by providing for
retroactive liability. They make persons liable for certain actions that were legal
when taken but which become actionable when they occur during some period of
time before a triggering event.200 The most straightforward example may be
Preservation Laws, WESTCHESTER B.J., Spring 1995, at 103.
197. See, e.g., Glaeser, supra note 39; Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation
and the Rise in Housing Prices 1-6, 18-21 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2020, 2003).
198. For a discussion of some of the political opposition to the Endangered Species Act, see, e.g., DOUB,
supra note 91, at 208-34; Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, The Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 50-51 (2001); Oliver
A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and
Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993); Walter Rusinek, Balancing Competing Interests: A Natural
Resources Law Primer, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Mar. 1995, at 24; Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Validity, Construc-
tion, and Application of Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543), 32 A.L.R. FED. 332
(1977). For an examination of cases and legislative history regarding historic preservation law, see Federal
Historic Preservation Case Law, 1966-2000, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., http://www.achp.gov/pubs-
caselaw.html (last updated July 15, 2008).
199. DOUB, supra note 91, at 208-34; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 169; Candidate Conservation/
Candidate Conservation Agreements, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 175.
200. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “retroactive law” as “a legislative act that looks backward or
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preferential payments in bankruptcy: a bankruptcy trustee can recover any
payments by the debtor made on valid debts within ninety days prior to the filing
of a bankruptcy petition.201 The purpose of avoiding preferences is to enforce
bankruptcy law’s policy of equal treatment among creditors by preventing
debtors from preferring some creditors in anticipation of bankruptcy.202 There are
other examples of statutes imposing retroactive liability on actions that were
legal when made in order to protect statutory policies fully in play after some
triggering event.203
What would retroactive liability look like for historic preservation or endan-
gered species protection? For historic preservation, it would attach liability for
demolition occurring some time before designation. This seems to not offer much
preservation benefit. Preservation law is far more interested in preventing
demolition than attaching liability for demolition; money will not adequately
compensate the public for the loss of a historic structure. Moreover, serious
enforcement of retroactive liability, say through heavy fines, would probably
deter too much demolition because owners would not know which buildings
might later be designated.204 Such an approach would be inferior to the system
employed by Cambridge, Massachusetts, discussed above, where no demolition
permit is issued for any building over fifty years old without consideration by the
preservation board whether to designate it for protection.205 That approach takes
advantage of the broader system for issuing permits for any demolition and
actually prevents destruction of valuable cultural resources.
Moreover, the Cambridge prophylactic approach is fairer to the property
owner. Retroactive liability always raises serious issues of fairness because of the
lack of notice prior to the conduct upon which liability is based. Of course,
legislatures might avoid such unfairness by adding a specific intent element to the
offense, but it would be difficult to prove that the defendant anticipated designa-
tion. The Cambridge system avoids retroactive liability by merely adding another
criterion to the standard for issuing a demolition permit.206 It also sets time limits
contemplates the past, affecting acts or facts that existed before the act came into effect.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1511.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2013).
202. Morris W. Macey, Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 28
EMORY L.J. 685, 690 (1979).
203. For example, in some states, property acquired and owned by one spouse may, upon divorce, be
considered marital property subject to equitable distribution to the other spouse. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§236(B) (McKinney 2010).
204. An alternate development might be changing the designation criteria to be narrower and more rigid, so
as to aid clarity. But that might well preclude designation of valuable resources.
205. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CODE § 2.78.090(A) (Supp. 5 2012), available at https://www.municode.com/library/
ma/cambridge/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeIdTIT2ADPE_CH2.78HIBULA_ARTIIDEBUDEBEHISI_2.78.
090PRDE&codeArchiveDate2012-12-21.
206. The added criterion is requiring consideration by the preservation board before any demolition permit
can be issued for a building more than fifty years old. Id.
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to avoid serious delay.207 Thus, it is not surprising that retroactive liability
provisions are not found in local historic preservation ordinances.
There might be a stronger case for retroactive liability for those harming a
species later listed as endangered. Generally, the damages recovered from those
who harm such species can be employed to protect remaining species members
and their habitat.208 Also, there is no general system of permitting before actors
harm fauna or flora analogous to the issuance of building demolition permits;
thus, there is no good alternative to retroactive liability to “move up” starting
points for protection of potentially endangered species. As such, some regime of
retroactive liability may have conservation value.
On the other hand, the problem of notice of which species are protected may be
even greater than for historic structures. Nothing visible or otherwise apparent to
the senses would inform a person that a species is declining in number and is thus
a candidate for listing; persons would need to know contextually how common
the species is within their range. By contrast, the visible age of buildings
(confirmable in real estate records) does provide at least some notice that a
building is a candidate for historic designation. Arguably, one need not be too
concerned about excessive deterrence against harming flora and fauna, given the
overwhelming physical effects of human activity on natural systems. Such lack
of notice makes attaching liability to otherwise lawful conduct impossibly unfair.
There may be a good argument for liability for harming any species with the
specific intent of avoiding coming under the jurisdiction of the ESA. A statutory
amendment could attach liability for harm to any species, including habitat
modification, undertaken with the purpose of preventing application of ESA
limitations to any specific property, either through listing a species or designating
critical habitat. Such a scienter requirement would eliminate concerns about
notice. While such specific intent violations are difficult to prove, even a few
successful cases could provide general deterrence against willful episodes of
“shoot and shovel.” It is hard to see a downside, given the limited reach of
liability to purposeful destruction. Even if such a law generated uncertainty
among landowners about their exposure to liability, it would amount to a modest
207. Id. § 2.78.090(D):
If the Building Commissioner shall not receive advice of [an initial determination that the building
may be significant] . . . within five business days of the date that a copy of the application is submitted
to the Commission staff, then, subject to Section 2.78.130 of this article, the Building Commissioner
may grant the [demolition] permit applied for unless prior to such grant he is advised that such an
initial determination has been made.
208. See Gardner M. Brown Jr. & Jason F. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered Species Act, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 1998, at 8, 14-15 (describing how federal funds are allocated to endangered species); Davison,
supra note 140, at 170 (stating ESA violations are subject to steep fines both criminally and civilly, which are
allocated to federal and state agencies). But cf. Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered
Species Act Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 250 (1998)
(describing why in the particular case of extinction, the collection of monetary damages is an ineffective tool for
preservation).
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breach of the presumption that any destruction of nature is permissible unless
specifically prohibited.209
D. LACK OF ENFORCEMENT
Both local historic preservation laws and the Endangered Species Act are
notoriously under-enforced against private owners due to a lack of resources or
fear of political fallout from confrontation. Local historic preservation laws are
primarily enforced by restrictions on granting building and demolition per-
mits.210 Local governments have very limited resources to see that work is
carried out in accord with issued permits. Washington, D.C. has two historic
preservation inspectors for the entire city. Neighborhood activists may report
unpermitted work, but such private oversight is inconsistent and can generate
unwelcome social conflict. The FWS also suffers from chronic understaffing.211
Moreover, the task of monitoring whether private owners across the nation are
directly harming endangered species or modifying habitats is inherently daunt-
ing. Local governments, which are closer to new development, may not be
understanding of, or sympathetic to, species conservation given other more
immediate goals.
It may well be that the lack of resources for enforcement of these laws reflects
ambivalence by legislatures about their goals or their regulatory costs. In any
event, practically speaking, lack of enforcement acts as a device to lessen the
perverse incentives of the regulatory structure. Rather than destroy the resource
before formal protection, private owners can ignore the regulation and gamble
that they will not suffer any penalty. This illegal but practical option also lessens
the political pressure to formally gut the laws. A weak enforcement strategy
might also be attractive to supporters of the law concerned about repeal because it
entails no formal surrender of substantive criteria, preserving them as ideals to be
realized in the future.
But weak enforcement is, on balance, a terrible means to lessen perverse
incentives. It actually multiplies them by offering another pathway to undermine
the goals of the respective laws. It also is opaque to public accountability, as it
drives behavior into secret channels. It makes evaluation of the law’s value
209. One may recall that when the Department of the Interior proposed a National Biological Survey in
1993, Congress strongly resisted it on the ground that it would amount to a search for endangered species to
justify more federal regulation. See Diane Krahe, The Ill-Fated NBS: A Historical Analysis of Bruce Babbitt’s
Vision to Overhaul Interior Science, in RETHINKING PROTECTED AREAS IN A CHANGING WORLD: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 2011 GEORGE WRIGHT SOCIETY BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON PARKS, PROTECTED AREAS, AND CULTURAL SITES
160 (Samantha Weber ed., 2012). Ignorance about the presence of ecologically valuable resources on land has
supported owners’ freedom to pursue development with immediate economic rewards.
210. See, e.g., D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 10-C, § 303.2 (2004) (“Historic preservation review shall be part of the
sequence of zoning and code reviews conducted before issuance of construction permits and subdivision plats
by the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs.”).
211. See, e.g., RASBAND ET AL., supra note 60, at 364-65.
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difficult because non-complying owners may simply be avoiding legal require-
ments that could work well if enforcement leaks in the system were plugged. That
makes it much harder to reform the laws to obtain greater net benefit. Thus, while
weak enforcement may have helped blunt perverse incentives created by historic
preservation and species conservation laws, they have undermined the laws in
other ways and hindered reliable evaluation of how well they are otherwise
crafted to meet their goals in a politically acceptable manner.
III. SUBSTANTIVE ADJUSTMENTS
The procedural fixes discussed above have substantive implications. Environ-
mentalists’ opposition to withholding the listing of species as endangered stems
from concern that the conservation plans will not provide as rigorous protection
as will listing itself.212 This section more explicitly considers adjustments to the
substantive protections offered to designated or listed resources. It considers both
compensating owners for the private losses such regulation may impose and
adjusting the regulatory structure to allow the owner to retain more value. To the
extent that such substantive changes reduce—and are seen as reducing—burdens
on landowners, they will lessen perverse incentives. Such changes may otherwise
hamper conservation of historic properties and species at risk, weakening
regulation under the guise of improving it. However, if the changes actually
protect critical habitats and encourage restoration of historic buildings through a
combination of sound government regulation or management and private owner
cooperation, they could advance important public goals at less cost to individuals.
A. COMPENSATION
The loudest and most long-standing complaint of landowners is that they
should be compensated for the economic losses imposed on them to achieve
widespread public benefits of historic preservation and species conservation.213
This is not the place to delve into the justice of such claims in depth, which have
been the subject of extensive literature.214 Suffice it to say here that such
arguments have merit only in the most extreme circumstances where owners
innocently bear crushing burdens and derive little or no benefit from regula-
tion.215 The inquiry here is how compensation might induce greater success at a
212. See, e.g., Molvar, supra note 172.
213. DOUB, supra note 91, at 208-12; Bean, supra note 180, at 206-18; John D. Echeverria & Glenn P.
Sugameli, The Endangered Species Act and the Constitutional Takings Issue, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW,
POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 292, 292-315 (Donald C. Baur & W.M. Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010).
214. See, e.g., DOUB, supra note 91, at 208-12; Desiderio, supra note 76; Susan Shaheen, The Endangered
Species Act: Inadequate Species Protection in the Wake of the Destruction of Private Property Rights, 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 453 (1994); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man
and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1993).
215. While several cases have been brought alleging an unconstitutional “taking” of property under the
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reasonable cost by overcoming owner hostility.
1. The Takings Clause
Efforts by property owners to obtain compensation for regulatory burdens
from historic preservation and the ESA have been spectacularly unsuccessful.216
The Penn Central decision, discussed above, rejected a regulatory taking claim
for preservation controls on an isolated landmark, analogizing it to zoning.217 In
his dissent, Justice Rehnquist accepted that historic district regulations ordinarily
do not create a taking because there is an “average reciprocity of advantage”; that
is, each owner is both burdened by limitations on its own property and benefitted
by the limitations on neighboring properties.218 Thus, any continuing arguments
about takings through preservation have focused entirely on individual land-
marks where such reciprocity is more attenuated.219
Subsequent to Penn Central, regulatory takings claims against historic preser-
vation regulations have largely disappeared. In a study I conducted in 2004, only
two reported decisions finding a taking could be identified, and none have been
reported since.220 At the same time, designations of individual landmarks have
proliferated in cities with strong preservation ordinances.221 Plainly, the law is
discouraging for owners of designated landmarks after Penn Central. But other
Endangered Species Act, such claims are almost never successful. See Echeverria & Sugameli, supra note 213,
at 293:
In the 35-year history of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), property owners have filed over a dozen
lawsuits claiming that the Act resulted in a “taking” of private property under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In only one instance, however, has such a claim
succeeded, in the controversial case of Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United
States. . . But six years later, in a similar case, Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, the
same court (indeed the same judge) repudiated the ruling in Tulare Lake. Thus, there is no surviving,
final legal authority supporting the argument that ESA restrictions result in constitutional takings.
Id. at 293; see also ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31796, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA)
AND CLAIMS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS “TAKINGS” (2013).
216. See Echeverria & Sugameli, supra note 213.
217. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (1978).
218. Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
219. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Rector of St.
Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990); Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC
v. D.C. Mayor’s Agent for Historic Pres., 944 A.2d 1036 (D.C. 2008); City of Pittsburgh v. Weinberg, 676 A.2d
207 (Pa. 1996).
220. J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation Laws After Penn Central, 15
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2004).
221. See, e.g., Heather Saucier, Historical Preservation Accelerating, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2002, at 1
(“[M]ore people are grabbing their calculators and finding that preserving historical structures makes good
economic sense, as the number of applications for historic designations continue to increase, said Robert
Fiederlein, chief of staff for District H City Councilman Gabriel Vasquez, whose district houses multiple
landmarks.”); Justin Rocket Silverman, Landmarking Lollapalooza, NEWSDAY, Oct. 31, 2007, at A14 (“In fiscal
year 2005, only 46 buildings were landmarked. In fiscal year 2007, 1,158 buildings received protection, the
highest number since 1990.”).
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factors also seem significant. The reality of historic preservation has seeped into
the consciousness of developers in cities with strong ordinances so they are likely
to buy property with the likelihood of designation in mind, which should affect
price.222 Moreover, designation does not prohibit development; it only requires
that changes to the exterior appearance of designated buildings be compatible or
appropriate. Thus, sophisticated architects and preservation boards can collabo-
rate on plans that permit substantial new development on many landmark sites.
Finally, historic features have purchase in the marketplace. Conversions of old
structures to new uses have contemporary consumer appeal.223 All this means
that the losses to property owners from landmark designation have never been as
great as had been feared in the early days of preservation.
Property owners also have not prevailed in regulatory takings litigation based
on the ESA. “[N]ot one successful taking claim under the Act has been
prosecuted in any Federal Court.”224 In the one takings decision of which I am
aware where a court found a taking under the ESA, the trial judge applied a
peculiar legal theory that he later rejected in a subsequent case.225 The reasons for
this absence of judgments are more elusive. The federal agencies have been
cautious in their enforcement of Section 9 of the ESA against private owners.226
The rise of bargained habitat regulation through HCPs, discussed below, concur-
222. See JONATHAN MABRY, CITY OF TUCSON DEP’T OF URBAN PLANNING & DESIGN, BENEFITS OF RESIDENTIAL
HISTORIC DISTRICT DESIGNATION FOR PROPERTY OWNERS (2007), available at http://www.preservationnj.org/site/
ExpEng/images/images/pdfs/Historic%20District%20benefits_Mabry_%206-7-07.pdf; PRES. CHI., HOW DOES
LANDMARK DESIGNATION AFFECT PROPERTY VALUES? (2003), available at http://www.preservationchicago.org/
userfiles/file/Policy-Initiatives-Creating-Landmark-Distirct-Property-Values-Study.pdf.
223. There is a certain market appeal to things that are “vintage” and “re-purposed.” An internet search for
“historic buildings converted” will return multiple examples of private historic conversions. See, e.g., Ten
Spectacular Projects Featuring Unusual Buildings Converted Into Private Homes, HOMEDIT, http://
www.homedit.com/10-spectacular-projects-featuring-unusual-buildings-converted-into-private-homes/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 14, 2015). One realtor selling homes in a historic neighborhood stated, “The people who are buying are
buying for the convenience of a quality vintage home with access to downtown.” See, e.g., Jim Harger, Buyers
Snatch up Mayor Heartwell’s Historic Condo in One Day, MLIVE (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.mlive.com/
business/west-michigan/index.ssf/2014/12/buyer_snatches_up_mayor_heartw.html.
224. Heyman, supra note 77, at 162. For a more recent study, see Echeverria & Sugameli, supra note 213, at
292.
225. Compare Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319-20 (2001)
(holding that the ESA requirement to leave water in streams for endangered salmon is a physical taking of the
water), with Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100 (2007). The subsequent history of
Casitas is complicated and still unresolved.
226. See Frederico M. Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against Takings in Section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109, 111 (1991):
Section 9 of the Act is a statutory provision with teeth, a law intended to be a powerful tool in a
national effort to ‘avoid further diminution of national and worldwide wildlife resources.’ [Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177 (1958).] Unfortunately, section 9 may have had too many teeth
for its own good. It has never been fully enforced. A variety of historical conditions and an apparently
general reluctance, on the part of both the federal government and citizens’ groups, to invoke the
far-reaching language of the section 9 taking prohibition have relegated it to a subsidiary role in
Endangered Species Act litigation, a satellite to the more limited substantive prohibitions embodied in
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rent with Sweet Home, also has provided breathing room for agencies to pursue
their goals without total bans on habitat degradation.227 Also, I suspect that much
destruction of habitat goes entirely undetected and therefore unchallenged. Much
tree cutting, meadow plowing, or stream diversion requires no permits and no
public notice at the state or local levels.
2. Regulatory Market
The absence of a constitutional right to compensation for regulatory losses
does not mean that property owners do not, or should not, receive some economic
betterment to address costly restraints on development. Historic preservation
abounds in indirect tangible benefits for owners of designated property. As in
Penn Central, some properties are eligible for transferable development rights
(“TDRs”).228 TDRs allow the owner of a property in an area with development
density restrictions to build at greater density in another designated area.229 Most
modern systems allow the owner to convey TDRs to a willing buyer.230
Generally, the TDR-receiving area is where additional development is either
desirable or neutral.231 This allows the property owner to retain some of the
economic potential constrained by the historic preservation (or other) restraint in
the sending area. TDRs thus make landmarking less onerous for property owners
because they retain market value by virtue of their ownership of the designated
property, which they can realize through development on a receiving site.232 It is
questionable how much TDRs are used in historic preservation now that such
regulation has become more common.
Owners of designated property also can obtain federal historic preservation tax
credits for qualified renovation projects.233 In addition, some states have tax
benefit programs that apply to a more extensive list of project types.234 Many
states propose to use these tax incentives as carrots to induce owner cooperation
Endangered Species Act section 17. The unwillingness to enforce the section 9 taking prohibition
fully has distorted the law of endangered species, creating a system of unequal justice . . . .
See also W. Parker Moore, Back to the Drawing Board: A Proposal for Adopting a Listed Species Reporting
System under the Endangered Species Act, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 105, 171 (2006).
227. For further explanation, see Richard J. McDonald, The Endangered Species Act: A Primer for Kansas
General Practitioners, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Apr. 2000, at 26.
228. RICK PRUETZ, BEYOND TAKINGS AND GIVINGS: SAVING NATURAL AREAS, FARMLAND AND HISTORIC
LANDMARKS WITH TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS AND DENSITY TRANSFER CHARGES 40 (2003); Byrne, supra
note 220, at 314.
229. Michael Kruse, Constructing the Special Theater Subdistrict: Culture, Politics, and Economics in the
Creation of Transferable Development Rights, 40 URB. LAW. 95, 95-96 (2008).
230. Id. at 96.
231. RICK PRUETZ, PUTTING TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TO WORK IN CALIFORNIA 8 (1993).
232. See generally JOHN J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT: LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE MARKETPLACE
(1974).
233. See BRONIN & BYRNE, supra note 19, at 592-620.
234. Id. at 618-19.
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for habitat protection under the ESA.235 Tax benefits of various sorts have
supported substantial private efforts to purchase land and conservation easements
for habitat.236 Farm programs pay farmers to maintain habitat (although not
primarily for endangered species).237 But public money will always be inad-
equate to “purchase” sufficient amounts of biodiversity.
Buzz Thompson, among others, have argued for employing TDRs for habitat
set aside on private land.238 This effort seeks to restructure the market so that
private parties will pay for conservation benefits. The FWS now has embraced a
variant of a TDR program through conservation banks.239 These are permanently
protected lands managed for supporting “species that are endangered, threatened,
candidates for listing, or are otherwise species-at-risk.”240 The owner of the
conservation bank then sells credits to property owners seeking to mitigate the
development of land as part of HCPs, discussed below.241 The purpose of this
approach is to allow development to proceed in some areas while providing
economic return to owners of better managed conservation for the same species
at another location. As such, conservation banking lessens the perverse incentive
for developers by creating a path through the ESA for profitable projects, while
providing positive economic incentives for conservation to the owner of the
bank. Conservation banking has its conceptual origins in wetland mitigation
banking under the Clean Water Act.242 The FWS issued Guidance in 2013 for the
Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks.243 The FWS has
approved more than 100 conservation banks.244
Conservation banks, like TDRs, seek to structure duties and powers so that
private money provides incentives for conservation.245 It may create a profession
235. Daniel A. Hall, Using Habitat Conservation Plans to Implement the Endangered Species Act in Pacific
Coast Forests: Common Problems and Promising Incidents, 27 ENVTL. L. 803, 836 (1997); Karen L. Smith,
Habitat Protection for the New Millennium: An Analysis of Domestic and International Regimes in North
America, 13 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 509, 522 (2001).
236. State and Local Tax Incentives, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/policy/tax-
matters/campaigns/state-tax-incentives (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
237. See Conservation Programs: Conservation Reserve Program, FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?areahome&subjectcopr&topiccrp (last updated Dec. 11,
2014).
238. Thompson, supra note 86.
239. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHMENT, USE AND OPERATION OF CONSERVATION
BANKS 4-6 (2003), available at https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/Conservation_Banking_
Guidance.pdf.
240. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CONSERVATION BANKING: INCENTIVE FOR STEWARDSHIP (2012), available at
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/conservation_banking.pdf.
241. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 239, at 2-4; J.B. Ruhl et al., A Practical Guide to Habitat
Conservation Banking Law and Policy, NATURAL RES. & ENV’T, Summer 2005, at 26, 26-27, 30.
242. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 239, at 2-3.
243. For Landowners: Conservation Banking, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/
landowners/conservation-banking.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2013).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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of biodiversity farming. Just as humans long ago turned to agriculture to provide
food for themselves, conservation banking employs habitat and species manage-
ment to provide for the ecological services of biodiversity, such as ecological
stability and genetic diversity. Of course, the problem with protecting ecological
services has long been understood to be that they are not purchased in the market,
as foodstuffs are.246 Conservation banks provide such an economic incentive, but
only because they provide a shield against the heavy hand of the ESA. Thus,
creative accommodation to a precipice regulation has the potential to convert
perverse incentives to wholesome incentives.
B. ACCOMMODATE DEVELOPMENT
Historic preservation law accommodates alterations and new construction to
an extent far beyond what many outsiders to the process realize. Review boards
in every jurisdiction permit alterations and additions to historic buildings, and
they permit new construction in historic districts when they are “compatible” or
“appropriate.” Some cities with the most development activity have the most
active historic preservation regimes. Washington, D.C. has the most extensive
historic preservation jurisdiction of any large city in the United States: approxi-
mately twenty percent of its properties are covered by preservation regulation.247
Yet, Washington, D.C. is experiencing an extraordinarily dynamic real estate
market.248 One aspect of its success has been the balance in implementation of its
preservation regulations, which both protect essential historical fabric and also
permit profitable contemporary new development. This balance is inherent in the
1978 Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act, which includes
within its stated purposes “to retain and enhance historic landmarks . . . and to
encourage their adaptation for current use.”249 Administration of the Act by a
diverse HPRB (aided by an excellent professional staff) has sustained retention,
rehabilitation, and adaptation with few major political confrontations.250
Experience with historic preservation regulation has lessened concerns about
how burdensome compliance is with its provisions. Don’t Tear It Down was
246. See, e.g., James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes From the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 170, 175-76 (2005).
247. Byrne, supra note 40, at 670.
248. Compare Market Reports: District of Columbia Overview, M SQUARED REAL ESTATE, http://
msqrealty.com/research/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2015) (tab “Average Days on Market,” then tab “List”) (average
Washington, D.C. home spent 55 days on the market), with January 2015 Real Estate Data: Monthly Housing
Summary, REALTOR.COM, http://www.realtor.com/data-portal/realestatestatistics?sourceweb (last visited Apr.
14, 2015) (average American home spends 103 days on the market).
249. D.C. CODE § 6-1101(b)(2)(A) (2001).
250. HPRB Members, D.C. OFFICE OF PLANNING, http://planning.dc.gov/node/601362 (last visited Apr. 14,
2015). But see Lydia DePillis, Failed Historic Preservation Review Board Nominations Endanger the Whole
Shebang, HOUSING COMPLEX (Jan. 6, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcom-
plex/2012/01/06/failed-historic-preservation-review-board-nominations-endanger-the-whole-shebang/.
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formed in the early 1970s as a scrappy, activist citizens’ preservation organization
to save the Old Post Office on Pennsylvania Avenue.251 Today, as the D.C.
Preservation League, it is a sophisticated preservation organization, with its
annual meeting funded by developers, lawyers, and architects that have come to
embrace preservation as part of the development process and as a means to secure
economic value.252 One might say that preservation has been coopted by
developers and their allies, but influence here is multi-lateral. If the HPRB is
sympathetic to development projects that respect preservation priorities, archi-
tects and developers have come to learn how to design and build effectively
within these constraints.253 The essence of this approach is to preserve the
important visible features of historic buildings on a site and design additions that,
while recognizably modern in flavor, are compatible in size and rhythms with the
historic fabric. Developers have found that the market likes these structures.254
The federal government also has become a major preservation developer. While
people differ on the aesthetic and historic assessments of different projects, there
is a general sense that preservation is woven into the development process.255
Each case presents a question of judgment and degree that challenges the HPRB
to make sensible and sensitive judgments.
The D.C. Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act also contains
a helpful “safety-valve” provision, the “special merit” provision, which permits
projects of exceptional public worth to be permitted, even if they are otherwise
inconsistent with normal preservation prohibitions.256 The Act defines special
merit as “a plan or building having significant benefits to the District of Columbia
or to the community by virtue of exemplary architecture, specific features of land
planning, or social or other benefits having a high priority for community
services.”257 The Mayor’s Agent will permit demolition or alteration of a
protected building or site if the agent finds that the project has special merit, that
251. A Brief History—1970s, D.C. PRES. LEAGUE, http://www.dcpreservation.org/about-us/history/1970s/
(last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
252. 2014 Annual Membership Meeting, D.C. PRES. LEAGUE (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.
dcpreservation.org/2014/09/2014-annual-membership-meeting-belmont-mansion-international-headquarters-
order-eastern-star/.
253. D.C. HISTORIC PRES. REVIEW BD., DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR HISTORIC COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS (2010),
available at http://planning.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/op/publication/attachments/HPO_commercial_
guidelines_revis_08_2010.pdf.
254. DONOVAN D. RYPKEMA & CAROLINE CHEONG, PLACEECONOMICS, MEASURING THE ECONOMICS OF
PRESERVATION: RECENT FINDINGS (2011), available at http://www.placeeconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/
03/economic-impacts-of-hp_findings.pdf.
255. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 40.
256. The statute permits demolition or alteration of a landmark or contributing building in a historic district
if the Mayor’s Agent finds that such demolition or alteration is “necessary in the public interest.” D.C. CODE
§ 6-1105(f) (2001). The phrase, “necessary in the public interest,” is specifically defined as “consistent with the
purposes of this act as set forth in § 6-1101(b) or necessary to allow the construction of a project of special
merit.” Id. § 6-1102(10).
257. Id. § 6-1102(11).
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damage to the historic resource is “necessary” to construct the project, and that
the project’s special merit outweighs preservation values.258 This creates a legal
mechanism through which the preservation values can be balanced against other
important public values in individual cases. Judicial and administrative decisions
have clarified the statutory language so that it is now well-established, for
example, that the ordinary incidents of development, such as increased property
tax revenue, cannot qualify for special merit. 259 On the other hand, enhanced
preservation or restoration beyond what the Act requires can help provide special
merit in the right circumstances, either as exemplary architecture or land
planning.260
The operation of the special merit inquiry can be seen in a recent decision by
the Mayor’s Agent. The District of Columbia Department of Housing and
Community Development (“DHCD”) and its developer partner sought a permit
to move two historic, but dilapidated, houses from a site on a main artery on the
boundary of the Anacostia Historic District to another site well within the historic
district in order to construct a new five-story building with 114 units of
subsidized housing and ground floor Class A retail.261 The HPRB had found that
moving the houses would not be consistent with the purposes of the D.C. Historic
Landmark and Historic District Protection Act because it would destroy their
integrity of location and diminish the historic district.262 After a lengthy hearing,
the Mayor’s Agent granted the permit, holding that affordable housing and
attractive retail space in that location met the threshold for special merit as high
priority community needs that outweighed the harm to the historic resources
because of the DHCD’s well-thought-out and well-funded plan to relocate and
restore the two historic houses.263 The decision relied on D.C.’s Comprehensive
Plan, which was enacted by the District Council, to find that the project met high
priority community needs. The HPRB also demanded that the new building be
modified in various design elements to be more compatible with the character of
the historic district.264
The special merit provision explicitly recognizes that the preservation of a
historic building is not an absolute value, but it can be fairly weighed against the
258. See, e.g., In re QC 369 LLC, Nos. 14-460 & 10-461 (D.C. Historic Pres. Office Jan. 27, 2015),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/library/collections/histpres/get-document.cfm?id_no239&displaytext.
259. See Comm. of 100 on the Fed. City v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Reg. Affairs, 571 A.2d 195 (D.C.
1990).
260. For example, in In re Square 452 Limited, the Mayor’s Agent permitted the demolition of a building of
limited integrity as part of a project that would fund restoration of a historic church not otherwise required by
the Act. In re Square 452 Ltd., No. 06-530 (D.C. Historic Pres. Office Sept. 27, 2007), http://apps.law.george-
town.edu/library-hp/decisions/hpa06-530.pdf.
261. In re 2228 MLK LLC, Nos. 14-221 & 14-222 (D.C. Historic Pres. Office Oct. 28, 2014), http://
www.law.georgetown.edu/library/collections/histpres/get-document.cfm?id_no237&displaytext.
262. Id. at 2.
263. Id. at 10.
264. Id. at 2.
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accomplishment of other important public development values. Of course, from a
historic preservation perspective, the risk in such an approach is that this balancing
provision can become a loophole that undermines preservation goals. The D.C.
ordinance guards against this risk by specifying the grounds upon which special merit
can be found by requiring that special merit decisions be made based upon a record
developed in a “contested case,” and by subjecting the decisions to review by the D.C.
Court of Appeals.265 The integrity of the decisions has been further bolstered by
entrusting the decisions to an official with substantial independence from political
actors and by the commitment of the Georgetown University Law Library to collect
and publish all of the Mayor’s Agent’s decisions on a website, enhancing their use as
precedents and thus building a body of largely consistent rulings.266 Having a balanced
and reasonably predictable special merit process protects the historic preservation law
from political outrage at frustrating, but nonetheless important, public projects. More
systematically, the special merit process reduces anxiety over designation because
designation does not permanently preclude substantial changes to every designated
building. At the same time, the high standard for a special merit finding incentivizes
applicants to maximize public value and minimize damage to historic resources.
The closest analog to historic preservation’s special merit provision in endangered
species law seems to be the exemption process, administered by the Endangered
Species Committee—popularly known as the “God squad.”267 This process was added
to the ESA in 1978268 in reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill.269 The Court in this case held that the plain meaning of Section 7 of
the ESA prohibited completion the Tellico Dam, given the uncontested findings that
doing so would render extinct the snail darter. Congress sought to rescue the dam by
creating the exemption process, by which a high-level special committee composed of
cabinet-level officials could determine that a project was sufficiently important to allow
it to go ahead despite anticipated harm to an endangered species.270 Like the special
merit provision, the exemption process applies demanding criteria, including that there
be no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action, that the benefits of the
action “clearly” outweigh the harms entailed in pursuing other courses of action, and
that the action must be in the public interest and be of national or regional signifi-
cance.271 Moreover, if an exemption is allowed, the committee must impose mitigation
265. See, e.g., Comm. of 100 on Fed. City v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 571 A.2d 195
(D.C. 1990).
266. GEO. L. LIBR., supra note 22.
267. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g) (2013).
268. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978).
269. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
270. The members are the Secretaries of Agriculture, Army, and Interior, the Administrators of the
Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Chair of the
Council of Economic Advisors, and a seventh member chosen by the President to represent the affected state. 16
U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3).
271. Id. § 1536(h).
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measures to minimize the adverse effects on the endangered species.272
Viewed superficially, the exemption process might be expected to create a
sensible safety valve mechanism, like the special merit provision, to accommo-
date important public projects and biodiversity, but this has not been the case.
Only six exemption applications have been filed, three of which were with-
drawn.273 The committee flatly rejected an exemption for the Tellico Dam.274 It
later became mired in a legal and political disaster regarding federal logging
affecting the northern spotted owl, which brought the process into disrepute
because of political strong-arming and judicial invalidation.275 In just one case an
exemption was awarded and implemented, but in that case it incorporated, as
mitigation, a settlement establishing an ongoing, successful mechanism to a
manage species habitat.276 Not surprisingly, after a thorough review of the
exemption process, Professor Parenteau concluded that “the exemption provision
[was] basically a non-factor in the administration of the ESA.”277
The exemption provision probably has been a failure because it was concocted
as a political compromise in the high-tension atmosphere following TVA v. Hill,
rather than developed from shared goals for harmonizing human activity and
biodiversity.278 Entrusting the decision to such high-level federal officials is both
cumbersome and seems to ensure politically tumultuous decision-making. Per-
haps, most fundamentally, allowing a project to proceed at the point where there
is a substantial risk that doing so will render a species extinct contravenes the
most basic policy of the ESA: to avoid jeopardizing and to conserve every known
species for future generations. Accommodation must occur long before a species
becomes endangered. Professor Parenteau identified as the chief reason for the
unimportance of the Endangered Species Committee the mechanisms for accom-
modation before listing developed in the Clinton Administration.279
As previously discussed, endangered species law has moved away from the flat
prohibitions of Section 9 to a regulatory approach that is more accommodating to
private development. The chief mechanism for this shift has been the HCP280 and
associated efforts to develop planning alternatives to accommodate habitat
protection with development planning as early as possible before a species is
actually listed as endangered. This points to a crucial difference between historic
272. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(B).
273. See Patrick A. Parenteau, The Exemption Process and the “God Squad,” in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
LAW, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES 143 (Donald C. Baur & W.M. Robert Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010).
274. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM 288-89 (2013).
275. See Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993).
276. Parenteau, supra note 273, at 145-46.
277. Id. at 151.
278. The political context surrounding the creation of the exemption process is memorably described in
PLATER, supra note 274, at 270-80.
279. Parenteau, supra note 273, at 151.
280. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 185.
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preservation and species conservation: conserving a living species requires
greater resources of time, space, and study than does preservation of an inert
structure. Accommodation of development and historic preservation can occur
long after designation because designation does not necessarily imply any
increased threat of destruction. But accommodation of development and species
conservation requires long-term, science-based planning to ensure adequate
habitat and other supports, as well as ongoing adaptation to changing circum-
stances, such as climate change, that may increase the threat to the species.
CONCLUSION
This article has explained how both local historic preservation laws and the
ESA employ precipice regulations that move from a state of essentially no
regulation to one that can appear to impose stringent regulations on private
property owners. Both extend protection only to specific resources, which
essentially embody public goods, only after an individualized investigation into
the respective criteria for special protection. The prospect of, and subsequent
procedure for, the designation of a historic building or an endangered species
provides notice and an opportunity for affected property owners to destroy the
resource on their properties before the designation or listing become effec-
tive, thus avoiding the additional regulation. Such behavior is generally legal
and may be rational, at least in the short-term. As such, both legal regimes
seem to create perverse incentives to destroy the very resource that they seek
to protect.
This article argues that these perverse incentives can be minimized both by
procedural reforms and by greater accommodation of the interests of regulated
property owners. It has examined specific innovations that seem to have over-
come the perverse incentives in some cases, but also has considered why others
have failed. It should be emphasized that this article argues for accommodating
the interests of property owners when feasible, and not for their own sakes or out
of a sense of justice to them (although either could be compelling in an individual
case), but rather to better achieve the goals of historic preservation and biodiver-
sity conservation. Sophisticated accommodation blunts political opposition to
these laws and may help them survive repeated assaults. The risk of such an
approach is that it will water down the public values or undermine actually
fulfilling them through concession to self-interested opponents or those holding
other higher values, such as liberty. Laws like the ESA and the D.C. Historic
Landmark and Historic District Protection Act are public markers that manifest
and shape public values. It is understandable that those who fought for their
enactment would not want to surrender the Maginot Line of strict enforcement.
The test for whether accommodation is appropriate is whether it in fact contrib-
utes to a world closer to that envisioned by these laws than would strict
enforcement of the precipice regulation.
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Measuring whether accommodation gives up too much requires that we have a
clearer sense of what goals historic preservation law and the ESA should be
understood to pursue. These laws are complex, and their goals are multiple and
contested. Both legal regimes embrace strongly felt and under-articulated values.
Historic preservation laws seek to preserve important physical representations of
the past to promote cultural memory, to maintain the urban scale of a pre-
automotive time, and to give communities a say about the look of new develop-
ment. Not every resource justifies the same level of preservation, and other values
may demand precedence. Analogously, the ESA seeks to halt the mass extinctions
that characterize our time, but it also provides a tool to address ecological
sustainability in a broader context. Use of the ESA to drive land use planning to
more ecologically sophisticated preservation of habitat and related resources
will, in some cases, be a legitimate tradeoff for strict prohibitions on “taking”
members of a struggling species. Blunt laws can become more nuanced and
comprehensive, as well as more accommodating. However, too thin notions of
preservation or biodiversity protection threaten to destroy what these laws
contribute to a richer sense of humanity.281 Both require a balance of idealism
and pragmatism.
Accommodation reforms have the virtue of blending human activity with
conservation of ecological systems and species. They move past traditional
opposition between a human realm devoted primarily to economic activity and
natural reserves set aside as if nature could flourish there without regard to
humans.282 Rather, they impel efforts at reaching some kind of harmonious
coordination of human activity within nature. At their best, they seek to overcome
the traditional legal oppositions between humans and nature that give rise to
precipice regulations in the first place.
In the end, it may well be that uncertainty or normative disagreement about the
amount of historic preservation or biodiversity that law should insist on, in light
of the costs placed on property owners, must relegate such questions to ongoing
political dispute. In such cases, effective procedures for reaching balanced
accommodation in specific cases may be all that can be accomplished. True
precipice regulations may not be politically sustainable. Procedures for negoti-
ated accommodation may allow for practical solutions and may be instructive on
how we can more effectively harmonize nature and human activity. But such
harmonization will not be easy.
281. Ecologist David Haskell stated: “It’s not true that every species that goes extinct is like another rivet off
the plane and the plane’s going to crash.” James Gorman, Finding Zen in a Patch of Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2012, at D1.
282. Thoughtful reflections on the inevitable and fruitful roles that humans can play in managing natural
systems are given in William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature, in
UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE, 69-90 (William Cronon ed., 1996); MICHAEL
POLLAN, SECOND NATURE: A GARDENER’S EDUCATION 176-201 (1991).
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